Bismarck: the dishonest broker? by Carlson, M. Dale.
BISMARCK ~ THE DISHONEST BROKER?
by
M. DALE CARLSON
B. S,, Kansas State University, 195>9
A MASTERS THESIS
submitted in partial fulfillment ol the
requirements for the degree
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of History,
Political Science and Philosophy
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
196U
Approved by:
Major Professor
LP
PfCU). ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Er# Werner H. Barth
tor his assistance in the writing of this paper. Kis suggestions,
cooperation, patience and kind understanding have been of tremendous
assistance.
The library staff of Kansas State University and Nebraska
University have my deepest thanks tor the patient assistance they
have given me in the collection of material tor this paper.
Appreciation must also be expressed to my wife Margaret, whose
typing, editing and encouragement have been essential in the com-
pletion of this paper.
PREFACE
From June 13 until July 13, an International gathering of the leading
statesmen of Europe met at the Congress of Berlin to decide the fate of the
Treaty of San Stefano signed between Russia and Turkey to conclude the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-78. At this Congress, Otto von Bismarck reached the
height of his political career* Representing a powerful Germany that he
had helped to construct, he presided as President of one of the three great
Congresses of the Nineteenth Century*
Bismarck professed that he entered the Congress as the nHonest Broker"
and would serve as umpire between the great powers of Europe. He stated
openly that Germany had nothing to gain, and no interests to serve in the
Eastern Question. But was this Bismarck's true role? Did he actually act
as the representative of a disinterested umpire for the powers? This study
is an attempt to discover Bismarck's true role and guiding motives in the
diplomatic negotiations preceding the Congress of Berlin, and in the actual
meeting itself.
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CHAPTER I
BISMARCK'S SEARCH FOR PEACE
Prussian victories, first over Denmark, then over Austria and finally
over France, overturned the balance of power as it had previously existed
in Europe, The preat powers, long content to contain the ambitions of
Napoleon ITI or block the expansionist policies of the Czar, now had to
readjust their foreign policies to meet the new situation created by the
eclipse of France, and the reorganization of Central Europe under German
leadership.
The architect of this transitional period was Otto von Bismarck, the
"Iron Chancellor of Germany." He had led Prussia from its position of
inferiority to Austria within the German Confederation, into the position
of leadership that climaxed in the formation of the German Empire. Prophe-
sying that "not by speeches and majorities will the great questions of the
day be decided—that was the mistake of 18U8 and 18U9—but by iron and blood,"
Bismarck helped to strengthen the Prussian army, diplomatically isolated his
foes and crushed them by war. 1 "Iron and Blood" was a hard, brutal policy
but it produced the results he was after—a mighty empire carved out of a group
of loosely bound German states.
This man who, after the Treaty of Frankfort in 1871, became the most
powerful statesman in Continental Europe, was born April 1, 1815 at
Schonhausen, Brandenburg. As son of one of the prominent Junker families
that constituted the governing class of Prussia, Bismarck was provided
"Emil Ludwig, Bismarck, the Story of a Fighter
.
(Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 1927), p. 207.
with an adequate education, but spent an unproductive youth* After a brief
military career which he hated. Bismarck and an older brother took orer the
family estates. Bored with this life. Bismarck soon earned the nickname of
2
the "mad Junker" for his wild escapades. Later, he tried to become a
civil servant but soon retired with the explanation. n I have never been able
to put up with superiors." *
Bismarck* s career began in 161.7 when he received the distinction of
being a substitute member to the United Diet called by Frederick William IV.
Here he won the King's approval for his reactionary attitude. This recognition
launched Bismarck on his road to fame.
Throughout his career, Bismarck was a staunch foe of Republicanism. He
felt sure Prussia could reach greatness only through a strong monarchy. During
those critical years of German history, he must be described as a reactionary*
When the Revolution of 181*8 reached Germany, Bismarck's first thought was to
rescue the King with the aid of his faithful peasants* When his efforts
came to nothing he protested against the Revolution by adopting the word
"Von," the symbol of the German aristocracy, to his name*
However, the Revolution gave Bismarck his great opportunity* After fight-
ing had broken out in Berlin, King William IV recalled the United Parliament*
2Grant C. Robertson, Bismarck * (London i Constable & Co., 1919) • p. 103*
As quoted in: Alan John Percivale Taylor, Bismrrck, the Story of a
Fighter . (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1927), p. 207.
^Frederick Darmstaedter, Bismarck and the Creat.jon of the Second Reich *
(London: Methuen k Co., Ltd., 36 Essex Street, Strand, W. C. 2., 19kU) t P» H»
Slbid
., p. 78.
Robertson, Bismarck, p. 63
•
Bismarck was elected representative to the Lower House by a l£2 to Dili margin.
His campaign slogans had been, "Fight the Revolution," and "Re-establish
the old bond of trust between the Crown and the People." • Throughout
the meetings, he fought for the monarchy ana thoroughly denounced the
Revolution.
Daring this time, the King developed the following opinion of Bismarck:
"red reactionary, smells of blood, only to be used when the bayonet rules." °
At this crucial period in German history, Bismarck served in the Constitutent
Assembly, the National Assembly at Berlin, and the Union Parliament at Erfurt.
He spoke often, and always in uncompromising resistance to the liberal program
o
of the revolutionaries.
Although the reactionary Junker did not serve in the Frankfort national
Assembly in which Frederick William IV refused the crown for a Constitutional
Monarchy, he nonetheless gained even more influence in the Prussian Court.
Upon hearing the news that the King had rejected the crown, Bismarck let it
be known that he was happy with the King*s decision. *-®
Bismarck now entered the political arena as a professional politician
with his appointment as delegate to the restored Federal Diet at Frankfort. ^
Here he strongly advocated Prussia's interests and effectively countered
Austrian policies, an approach that gained him even more support from
Frederick William IV. By the tine the Crimean War broke out, Bisr.arck was
'Darmstaedter, Bismarck, p. 8li.
°As quoted in: Robertson, Bismarck , p. 62,
9Ibid
., p. 62.
lOTaylor, Bismarck , p. 28.
11Darmstaedter, Bismarck, p. 106,
strong enough to exert Important influence upon the King. He ur.^ed that
Prussia adopt a policy of strict isolation. He said: "I should be alarmed
if we sought protection from the approaching storm by tying our neat sea-
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worthy frigate to Austria's vorm-eaten old battleship." xc When Frederick
William IV signed a three year defensive alliance with Austria, Bismarck
was in high agitation. *3 He felt that this period provided Prussia with
an opportunity to gain leadership among the German states. The pact with
Austria would only postpone the decision.
Just as Bismarck was enjoying great influence in Berlin, Frederick
William TV became insane. He was followed by William I. The new King
regarded Bismarck as a wild reactionary and, in Bismarck's own words, "out
him on ice," by declaring him Prussian ambassador at St. Petersburg,
January 29, 1*59. ^
This was a blow to Bismarck. At Berlin he could smoke Havana cigars
from morning until night, drink Black Velvet—a mixture of stout and
champagne he invented—and retire to his family estates for Deriods of
relaxation. At St. Petersburg he was isolated. The small salary he re-
ceived did not let him entertain as others did. *-5 Yet, because of his
haughty manners and free spirit, he became a great favorite at the Russian
Court. Bismarck put this time to valuable use by becoming a personal friend
of the Csar, and he was able to get along well with Gorchakov, Russian
^As quoted in: Robertson, Bismarck
. p # 91.
^Taylor, Bismarck , p. 39.
1'^Darmstaodter, BJ3m?rck
. p. 106.
John Lord, %acon Lights of History . Vol. X: European Leaders,
(New York: James Clarck & Co., IBJTJJ p. 3'X).
Foreign Minister. By this friendship, he created a credit upon which he
could Icier draw, 16
In January 1861, the King came into conflict with the Prussian Chamber
over reform of the army. A deadlock resulted which reached such serious
proportions that William I threatened to resign. "*•' Bismarck, closely
watched these events from his position in St. Petersburg. In July 1661,
he drafted the Baden Memorial to King William I. In this document Bismarck
urged the King to put Prussia at the head of the unitary movement and lay
before the Federal Diet, a proposal to create a National Parliament,
chosen by direct suffrage from all Germany. He assumed the existence of a
strong Prussian army and the will to employ it at the right moment in
no
imposing a Prussian solution on all points of conflict. The Kin? re-
fused to adopt Bismarck's principles but he regarded them favorably. This
can be seen by the fact that Bismarck's isolation in St. Petersburg ended
by his appointment as Prussian Ambassador at Paris, May 29, 1862. **
As the deadlock between the King and the Prussian Chamber continued,
the King summonod Bismarck from Paris to Berlin fcr an interview. On the
morning of September 22, 1862 Bismarck met with the King. Here he persuaded
William I to tear uo the abdication notice he had drafted, put himself
unreservedly at his sovereign's disposal, and declared his readiness to
fight to the last for the rights of the Crown and the royal scheme of
^Robertson, Bismarck , p. 103.
•^Darmstaedter, Bismarck , p. 18U.
^Robertson, Bismarck, p. 112.
19Ibid
. , p. 113.
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reorganization of the army. William I agreed that Bismarck was the
nan who could break the deadlock and immediately appointed the "mad Junker 11
21
as President Minister of Prussia,
The question might now be asked, what kind of a man was Bisraarck?
First, he held a firm belief in the feudalistic right of royalty to rule
their subjects. He wae determined to support to the utmost the power of
the Crown. He accepted the principle of constitutional government but only
as a power in the hands of the monarch to restrain popular agitation and
22
maintain order* His central aim and constant thought was the ascendency
of Prussia, and later, the German Empire.
Bismarck could be described as anything but a social gentleman. He
ate only once a day but did so in such large quantities that it would do
five men. He could drink a quart of beer or wine without taking the cup
from his mouth, and he smoked incessantly, using either cigars or a long
Turkish pipe. His manners were brusque and rough. This coupled with
his enormous physical size made him feared more than he was honored. He
was well read in history, but not in art, science or poetry. Outside of
23
music, he cared little for the arts, Bismarck's first love was foreign
affairs. He said, "Foreign affairs are, for me, an end in themselves, more
2k
important than anything else in the world,"
2QIbid„ p. 112.
Tterrastaedter, Bismarck , p. 1?U.
22
Lord, Beacon Lights , p. 27U.
23Ibid., p. 277.
^As quoted in: Ludwig, Bismarck, p. 507.
This interest is reflected in the yoar3 from 1662 until 1871. During
this period Bismarck's policy of iron and blood, resulted in wars with
Denmark, Austria and France. In each, Prussia was successful. The end
result of Bismarck's labors ware realized with the Treaty of Frankfort,
May 10, 1671. ^5 Here, a united Germany became a reality.
In 1671 the Iron Chcncellor was fifty six years of age. Though some-
what fatigued by his labors he mi at the height of his extraordinary
powers. u Since the days of the first Kapoleon no man had been so feared
and admired, ^ven his enemies did not venture to question his genius. His
dominant personality, his gift of a use of caustic expressions, the apparent
reckless frankness, the very brutality of his utterances, fascinated and
subjugated those with whom he came into contact.
He wrs infinitely resourceful in detail, keeping open various possi-
bilities and se med always ready to change on the instant, if need be,
from one course of action to another. He was never off his guard, and was
constantly pumping end bewildering his opponents. '
The year 1871 marks a turning point in Bismarck's career. His phi-
losophy changed from "blood and iron" to one of peaceful security for
Germany. Prior to 1871 it had been necessary to win power for Germany, in
order to effect unification. After 1871, it was not his object to add to
the fabric he had erected. He confined himself to strengthening it and
2$Taylor, Bismarck , p. 39.
^Archibald Cary Coolid^e, The Origins of the Triple Alliance
. ( m
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1^17), p. 27.
27
Ibid., p. 27
putting it in a position to weather future stoma. He strove to consoli-
date the new empire and to make its Inhabitant! feel its advantages, to
win over tbt &tnoontent»< elements, to stimulate its economic development
28
and to kenp up its military strength at the highest point of efficiency.
This became the guiding motive throughout the remaining nineteen years of
hia reign.
In the accomplishment of this task, Bismarck^ past proved to be a
burden. In Europe as well as in Germany, his every move was eyed with sus-
picion and distrust. As instigator of three wars in which Prussia had
been victorious, it was feared by many that he might renew his desire for
conquest 3t further expense to European states. After all, was not hia
definition of an opportunist, "A man who uses the most favorable oppor-
29
tunity to carry through what he regards as useful and appropriate."
Lord Odo Russell, English ambassador at Berlin, said of Bismarckj "Napoleon
III was not more powerful than Bismarck is at this moment."
Bis^arck^ problem was how could he get Europe to dispel the distrust
that surrounded him, and could he get Europe to realize his policy was
pacific militarism and not aggressive militarism. He had succeeded in
effecting the political unity of Germany without calling into existence s
hostile coalition, but in 1871, in light of Germany's successes, would he
be able to prevent the other continental states from uniting out of fear or
2S
Ibid., p. 30.
'As quoted in: Taylor, Biamarck . p. 158
•
' As quoted ini Alfred Francis Pribram, England and the International
Policy ol the European Great Powers, 1871-191U * (Oxford* Clarendon Press,
1931), p. 9.
Jealousy of Gennan strength? In his memoirs, Bismarck expressed this
concern:
It is our interest to keep the peace, whereas our continental
neighbours cherish wishes (some of them secret and some of them of-
ficially acknowledged) which can only be fulfilled by means of war
..•our development into a great power has aroused fears which we
must try to dispel by the honorable and pacific use of our influence
...respect for the rights of other states... is made easy for the
German Empire, on the one hand, by the objectivity of the German
character, and, on the other, by the fact that we do not need any
enlargement of territory, and could not achieve such an enlargement
without strengthening the centrifugal elements in our domain. My
ideal has always been that, after establishing unity within the
frontiers attainable by us, we should win the confidence . . . of the
great powers j that German policy, after the injuria temporum» the
disentegration of our nation, has been made good, should be peaceful
and just...when contemplating international disputes which can only
be settled by war. I have never been inclined to regard them by
the standard which prevails at a student's duel. 31
In order to solve these problems, Bismarck based his hopes on four
principles. First, Germany must keep strong militarily, she must isolate
France from any possible coalition and thirdly, the isolation of France
must be accomplished through a system of alliances with the powers of
Europe so that a new war would not find Germany isolated. The fourth step
in Bismarck 1 s policy was that after he had succeeded in the isolation of
France, he must use his position and influence to prevent any crises that
might result in a European war. It is with this fourth principle that this
paper will be primarily concerned. However, it will be necessary to discuss
the first three principles to see how they were accomplished.
Prussia had been a military state, and after German unification was
complete, Bismarck was certain that this military power must be maintained.
3*-As quoted int Ludwig, Bismarck, p. 508.
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Therefore, in dealing with the Reichtag , on one point he would not budge
—
reduction of the army. He fought to maintain it to the utmost extent the
-50
nation could bear, * This military sight became the essential backbone
of Bismarck's policy, had he represented inall or a weak state he could
have been constrained to rely on foreign aid to carry out his plans* But
as things were, Bismarck could speak with the authority of the strongest
army in the world to back his words. ** He was not concerned with using
it for future conquests as some thought, but as an imperative necessity to
^usrd the empire. These views are expressed clear3.y in a speech delivered
before the Reichtag in 188( 1
Wt must be as strong as we can in these days . We have the capa-
bility of being stronger than any other nation of equal population in
the world, and it would be a crine if we did not use th ability*
We must still make greater exertions than other powers for the same
ends on account of our geographical ion we lie in the midst of
Europe. We have at least three sides open to attack. God has placed
on ana side of us the French—a most warlike and restless nation, and
he has allowed the fighting tendencies of Russia to become great} so
we are forced into measures which perhaps we would not otherwise make;
and the very strength for which we strive shows that we are inclined
for peace; for with such a powerful machine as we wish to Bake the
German army; no one would undertake to attack us—we Germans fear God
but nothing else in the world and it is the fear of God which causes
us to love and cherish peace. 3U
To dominate European diplomacy as he felt he had to do for the sake of
Germany, Bismarck had to have an army whose threatened use could decide an
issue and prevent war. Therefore, the army was one of Bismarck's prime
concerns.
Jerse,
-^Lord, Beacon Lights , p. 309.
33lbid., p. 309.
-^Louis L. Snyder, Documents of German History . (New Brunswick, New
y: c :Jniversitv rr'ess, 195- )> /• 1-1 •
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The second step in Bismarck' 8 policy was the isolation of France. In
1871, France was in a chaotic state. Her prestige was shattered and her
army and finances were those of a vanquished nation. She was compelled to
play a secondary role and to submit to the organization of Europe with or
without her. It appeared as though the former empire would be a threat to
no one. Even in this state, Bismarck feared France. With her he asked
nothing better than to live in peace, but on the basis of her past per-
formances he feared her hostility, especially since the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine and her former predominance in Euronean affairs. He felt that
France would continually be on the watch for an opportunity to obtain
it
revenge by rebuilding her fallen fortunes at Germany's expense. ** Of
France alone he had no fear, but the possibility of France constructing a
coalition of powers hostile to the German Empire constituted a veritable
nightmare. He had to isolate France, or at least Insure that she with her
allies would be kept weaker than Germany with her allies, and consequently
she would never contemplate aggressive moves against Germany. 3" This
statement made by 3ismarck stresses this point:
It is necessary for us that we should be left in peace by France.
If France will not keep the peace with us, we must prevent her finding
allies. So long as she has no allies, France is not dangerous to usj
and so long as the great monarchies of Europe hold together, no
republic is dangerous to them. On the other hand, a French republic
will find it very difficult to secure a monarchical ally against us. 37
The cornerstone of his policy was to keep Germany out of war and to
prevent all wars in which she might become involved. To do this he had to
-^Robertson, Bismarck, p. 330.
3°Coolidge, Origins of the Alliance
, p. IjO.
J
'As quoted in Ludwigj Bismarck , p. 507.
1Z
isolate Franc- ju-; «s uj did in w*w u^;> pr,i.or wo the zxanco-Prussxun war.
At this woa© Jiswarck evaluated olie nations of Europe for a possible
alliance or MfllitiM ftfBi&ft FkttBM* Gno by >>ne, eaua nation was weighed
by the tkrowd BhMMllifNF wo see II md alliance wiun wiem would oe to wie
boat latfMtl of Germany.
xu*iy was coiisidsr#d as a possible aiiy. in fact, Bismarck hupad to
bring iier into an alliance after she became sponger* -* He felt an
alliance between Germany and the Italian goverAtaont would be easy to con-
clude because Germany was mostly Prows taut, and would iialt the Pope's
attempt to regain his land. However, at this time Bismarck did not feel
that Italy could offer sufficient military aio. in return for who risk
Germany mignt have to assume by supporting uer. As a result, Italy was
by-passed for the time being*
Spain, on the Soutnern border of France, geographically, offered Germany
a potential valuable ally. After a closer examination however, the golden
age of Spain had ended long ago. Spain in 1571 was torn by civil war
caused by an extremely feeble government. She was almost negligible in
Europe. An alliance with Spain would accomplish little.
Another possibility examined by Bismarck, was an alliance with England.
In 1^71, Lord Salisbury said:
Imperial England and satiated Germany could be very good friends,
on the sole grounds that you love those most whom you compete with least.
Germany was afraid of French and Russian ambitions in Europe; England
was afraid of French and Russian ambitions in the world outside of «-
Europe. Germany is clearly cut oat to be our ally—for the present. ™
3"A. J. Bucler, Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, Being the Re-
flections and Reminescences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck. 2 vols. (New
York <k Londoos Harper S Brothers, 1893), II, 2o5.
39
Raymond J. Sontag, Germany and England. (New York* D. Appleton-
Century Company, 1938), p. 9k
•
13
However, in 1871, British public opinion was still directed against
Germany. Their attitudes were much the sane ns they had been alter
Koniggratz, the crushing bombardment of Paris, £-nd the fall Of France. At
this time they referred to Bismarck as, "The bold and bad with his idiot
King in his pocket," "0 Punch had expressed England's resentnent best
with the statement, "A new minister to Prussia has not been found. Ws
have hanged almost everybody fit to be sent there.' 1 This period had
influenced the sale of The JBattle of Perking, a description of an imaginary
German invasion of England, which caused a purest deal of excitement in
England and even resulted in the British strengthening their army. *& As
a result, in 1871, Britain would be described as anti-German. Perhaps the
main reason for all of the hostility was that Germany had made greet pdni
by "Iron and Blood" while at this same time Liberalism in England was at
its brightest point. Thus there was a natural conflict of ideologies that
made Conservative Germany an enemy of Liberal England.
Bismarck, on the other hand was aware of the advantages of an alliance
with England. The whale of the sea and the elephant of the continent
should be natural allies. However, he was sure that as long as Gladstone
was Prime "inister and Liberalism was the dominant philosophy, England's
policy would be anti-Prussian. ^ Besides, she was too much interested in
her commerce, and in her colonial affairs, and too unreliable, because of
u
^As quoted in: Sontag, Germany and England , p. 9U.
^Jbid., p. 9U.
t2Jbid., p. 62.
'-^Pribram, England and International Policy , p. 8.
Ui
her democratic influences, to be counted upon, ^* Therefore, in 1871,
Bismarck turned his back on Liberal Snglrr.d. France was Ervlmd's colonial
rival so he need not be concerned about an Anglo-French alliance.
The survey of the nations of Europe r.r.rrowed the field down to two
nations, Austria-Hungary and Russia. If Francs was to find an ally that
would endanger Germany it would be either Austria-Hungary or Russia.
Bismr.rck lived in constant horror of a Russian, French and Austrian
alliance. ^ In his memoirs Bisnarck said*
A renewal of a coalition between Austria, Russia and France might
be confronted without despair by a United Germany which conducted her
campaigns wit* skill j nevertheless, it would be a very serious combi-
nation* the formation of which it must be the aim of our foreign
policy to prevent, U6
He felt that England would undoubtedly join this alliance t^us rendering
Germany isolated on the continent of Surone. In 1879, Count Peter Schuvelov,
Russian ambassador at Berlin, asked him, "You have the nightmare of cos-
liti-ons?" Bismarck answered, "Yes, necessarily." ^ Then in a letter
written to his son Herbert in the Autumn of 187?, Bismarck told him:
A French newspaper recently said of me that I had > le cauchemar
ds3 coalitions , 1 German minis-oers of state will for a long time to
come, and perhaps for always., have good reason to suffer from t^is
nightmara. The Western powers can easily form coalitions against us
with the accession of Austria} but oerhaos even more dangerous would
be a coalition between /.usuria, Hussia and France* U&
^^ooiidge, Origins of the Alliance . p. 3U.
U6,
^Ibid., p. 38,
Butler, Bismarck , p, 2(2 •
i
"''As quoted in: Coolidge, Origins of the Alliance , p, 36,
As quoted in: Ludvig, disrnarck, p, 305*
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This fear is pointed out by the following statement made by Bismarck
in his later years
!
We had waged victorious wars against two oi Europes great powers;
everything depended upon inducing at least ona of the two whom we had
beaten in the field to renounce the anticipated design of uniting with
each other in a war of revenge... this situation demanded an effort to
limit the range of a possible anti-German coalition by means of treaty
arrangement, placing our relations with at least one of the povers on
a firm footing. The choice could be only between Austria and Russia. U9
Action was first taken for an alliance of this type in 1870. When
Bismarck was at Meaux, he had gone through the process of sounding out the
Austrians and Russians for their attitude toward such sn alliance. Working
earnestly and with much haste he was able to arrange s meeting of the
Emperors of Germany, liussia and Austria in September, 1872. At this meeting
a union referred to as the Dreikciserbund (Three Emperor's League) was
discussed. Although no written agreement was signed, the three Emperors
came to a close understanding. -^ Finally on April 2U, 1873, Emperor
William I, ismarck and Holtke visited St. Petersburg and signed a secret
military agreement whereby each would support the other with 200,000 men
in case of attack by a third power. *** Later in May Czar Alexander II
visited Schonbrunn Au8tria. Here, in a meeting with Franz Joseph I, an
a reement was signed which completed the organization of the Dreiksisurbund
.
In essence, this ar-reement provided that the three conservative monarchs
united for peaceful aims, were willing to endeavor to adjust their eventual
conflicting interests and in case of danger from without would strive to
4
"3utler, Bisnarck
. p. 25>1.
'°Cooliage, Origins of the Alliance , p. U8.
^Ibid., p. 51.
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co:j3 to an a^jreemeut with each other before seeking allies elsewhere,
Bismarck felt that he had reached the solution to his problem. So long
as the Preike iserbund continued, peace was assured. The military power
of these three monarchies was so great that against thera in conjunction,
the other Suropean states were helpless.
The question irdurht now be asked, how did Bismarck succeed in ac-
complishing this alliance? How was he able to get Austria, a power that
had been beaten by Germany, to agree to an alliance? How was he able to
get Austria and Russia, both .jealous of each others motives in the Balkans,
to agree to cooperate with each other? To answer these questions one must
take a closer look at the diplomacy behind the scenes. This action will
reveal the underlying factors that enabled this alliance to take form.
As early as 1866, Bismarck had thought that someday a German-Austrian
alliance might be necessary. It is for this reason that as moderate a
treety as possible was submitted to Austria, after the Austrian-Prussian
War, Bismsrck refused to annex territory even against the will of King
William and public opinion. As a result, soon after the fall of Sedan,
Austria lost most of her feelings for revenge. Secretly, she desired a
rapproachmsnt with Germany in order to prevent the growth of a hostile
Russo-German understanding, made possible after the fail of France, This
was further evident when Count Julius Andrassy, the Germanophile ana friend
of reconciliation was selected as Prime Minister, " Andrassy desired the
alliance in order to acquire closer relations with Germany, He desired to
Count Julius Andrassy, Bi3rnarck, Audrassy and^ their Successors .
(Boston: Houghton Att'flin company, 192? J, "p. 16".
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carry out reforms In the Balkans which would insure the existence of the
Cttoman Empire or if this failed, to form Christian states independent of
the Czar. Tn order to do this he had to have (iermany in hio camp.
After the Russians and Germans had sij^ied their part of the treaty in
l£73» it was offered to Andrassy too. However, he refused it because:
This treaty would have bound us to the side of rtoscis even if
on account of their conflicting ambitions in the East, the Czar should
be attacked by England and Turkeyj also to defend Alsace-Lorraine
against the French, in short, to jeopardize our existence in the inter-
ests of others. 5>3
The original terms were completely unacceptable to Andrassy. Because
of his insistence he was able to sign the alliance without taking on the
obligation to defend the other two. This was considered as a diplomatic
victory for Andrassy over the great Pismarck. Perhaps it was, but Bismarck
was satisfied with the price he had to pay for his alliance.
On the other hand, Russia was easier to deal with. Immediately upon
hearing the rumor of a possible Austrian-German rapprochement during the
Emperor Franz Joseph's visit to the Emperor Vfilliam I at Berlin, August
lCyi, the Czar offered a written treaty of alliance to Germany. -^ Bi3marck
immediately accepted. The Dreikaiserbund was now complete. The ease by
which this treaty was completed was a result of the strong ties that had
existed between Prussia and Russia. The Pohenzollerns and the Romanoff
families were very close. Both vere anti-Polish; and Prussia and Russia
had fought 3ide by side against Napoleon. Bismarck also was on good terms
with Russia. It is certain that Pismarck received Russia's benevolent
CO
*Ji\n quoted in: Andrassy, ' ::i3Tv-rck 1 Andrassy a no their Successors , p. 17.
Coolid 'e, Origins of the /'lliance
. p. b7.
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a of the XTeatj of 16. . ;.s Incident an
good vj LI i •.: -- luatria
France. LsmfiTCli aaiar tri -o
it. Pa rg, a; ill f ihila oral 3.
Ml of " - ri plus 1 fear of isolation enal."!. md
RttMia to eaailj ' . OreiVai •' vi.
s formation of the Alliance hsd taken place, ^ck tlanaasl
on thrOS principle that would wcrk to holi the poaora t . -st, each
of the three powaora were anti-polish. £ech had gained from the Three
pti lions of Poland In the JtajatoaiitB Century,, and none of them Aeulrod
the creation of a n=*w Poland. Bismarck could use this dealra to keep the
powers working together for that purpose* Secondly, Biarnarck felt that the
batr.le agaisat Liberalism would tend to bold the three Conservative
ffonareaa together, ' The nqwron regarded iba "Revolution" as Laa hany.
Blanarotc encouraged this idea because monarchal solidarity tended to draw
S7
Russia and km ria toward Germany, end away fro* France, Irdl
,
>isrfprck felt that with the signed alliance he had a raluabla tool elti
wMcV- to tighten Russian-Austrian relations. They had r n
thin? s over before seeking alliances with other powers, therefore, thro
the Le?f*ue, any itlaaflTaaiaant aeuld be solvd pe ly and if either of the
power.' tall I of war lanarok could thraataa to use the r-erman rr liaat
**XMu>, P . 19.
Sogofits "- rrriPny and "?n --:l?nd, p. 137.
., • 137.
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them.
With the signing of the Srcikafjserbr.nd ir IP73 I rok't ftalj were
cornyl3to. The I -de JHPBiiqr the supreme land power la tar . It was
strong and through Bis^arck^ guidance Itfl VtfVQgtfe was to be preserved.
France, the hereditary foe was defected end through thn Dreikalserbund and
A*f indifference, was isolated, 3crma"y was all. I I I and
Russia. Collectively, they made a force so formidable that no ptVMP dared
attack them.
An ordinary statesman would hove been content with this situation and
would have had little reason to worry. However, Bismarck Mold not assume
this position. Bf*n after the signing of the Preikaiserbund, he was con-
tinually searching and scheming for some new way to strengthen the alliance.
He worried for fear that some small incident would develop into a European
war. He worried for fear that MM small incident would develop so that
Austria and Russia would renounce their alliance obligation and side with
France in a coalition leaving Germany isolated and helpless. In fact, by
18?5 he had worried himself so much and had been under such a mental strain
that he was forced to retreat to TanlBj his North Prussian estate, in
order to rebuild his strength. The events cf 1875 were to prove that these
forrs .lore not entirely without foundation.
CHAPT-iH II
WAR SCARE OF 18?5
After five yea^s of relative quiet in foreign affairs, during which
Bismarck was able to initiate many of his internal reforms, the spotlight
shifted once again to international affairs. Two incidents occurred in
1875 that caused not only Bismarck but the rest of Europe as well, a great
deal of anxiety lest the peace be broken. The first of these was the War
Scare of 1875. The second; the outbreak of revolt in the Balkans, To the
Iron Chancellor, both of these events > at first glance, seemed like minor
incidents, but careful examination told him that both of them posed a serious
threat to his policy of isolating France, and more important, the mainte-
nance of the Dreikaiserbund , These two events were teats for his system,
and taxed his influence and capabilities to the fullest.
The War Scare of 1875 was a diplomatic episode to which perhaps more
importance has been attached than really belongs to it. It has still not
1
been completely cleared up. Its origin goes back to the end of the Franco-
Prussian War, France at this time was a defeated nation, wracked by
internal disorder and a huge war indemnity, let, this disastrous eclipse
that had befallen France in 1870-71 had been followed by a recovery which
filled both friend and foe with admiration and surprise. Not merely had
Thiers 1 effort to pay this indemnity and ensure evacuation been completely
successful, but the French army was steadily reorganized and national
2. T, S, Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-191U * (London:
Methuren & Co., Ltd, 1928), p. xiv.
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prosperity was a jain apparent,
while this was being accomplished, during the years 1&73-167U, there
had been a noticeable deterioration in the relations between France and
Germany. This was largely due to the effect on UaUuoiic opinion in all
countries of the ooen conflict between the German government and the Roman
church, generally known as the Kulturkamof . J The French Bishops, esoecially
the Bishop of Nancy, had published certain pastoral letters which caused
indignation 8nd anxiety. ^ The Belgian church had also joined in the chorus
of protests denouncing the actions of Bismarck. This situation was further
intensified when Marshal MacJ^lahon became President of France. He was pro-
Catholic and held the support of the Royalist party. Furthermore, the Due
Decazes, a nervous, ambitious diplomat was awarded the post of Foreign
Minister. As a result of these actions, Bismarck definitely feared that
France under MacMnhon might aim at a coalition with Catholic Austria, hostile
to Germany. ' Bismarck^ position in this matter is clear in V\e years
prior to 1875. Regarding France as a nation still suffering from defeat,
and diplomatically isolated from the rest of the nations of "urope, he
felt that through some well placed threats, France could be persuaded
from attempting to enlarge her arr^y or disembark on a policy that would
place her in a coalition against Germany. As a result, he attempted to
2
'H. W. Seton Watson, Britain in Burope, 1789-1911i . (Cambridge:
University Press, 1955), p. 506.
^Dugdale, German Documents , p. 2.
^Henri George Stephan Adolphe Opoer Blowitz, Memoirs of M. de blowita
.
(New lorkt Doubleday Page k Co., Iy03), p. 101.
"^Dugdale, German Documents, p. 1.
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save Thiers by dire threats of the effect his fall would have on Germany.
Repeatedly he threatened that, if convinced of French aggressive designs,
Germany would attack. Against his Kulturkampf he demanded the French govern-
ment silence Bishops who preached against it and he spoke ambiguously of
influential elements in Germany who wished a preventive war. These atti-
tudes are clearly shown in the following statements made by Bismarck, First,
in a letter to Count Arnira, German ambassador to Paris, dated October 30, 1873 >
Bismarck wrote:
No government would be so foolish if, contrary to its wishes,
war had to be considered unavoidable, as to leave its opponents the
choice of time and opportunity, and to await the moment which would
require a clear political horizon, and even before the war of 1870,
often -ire expression to the view that the outbreak of a war would
be lesa .armful to it than constant threat of war, 7
And again in January 187U* in a letter to Arnim, he wrote: "If French
policy makes itself subservient to the hostile endeavours of the Roman
Curia, we should consider ourselves as threatened, and have to consider
8
methods of defense,"
In April, 1675* in answ r to attacks made by Belgian church officials
on his Kuiturk&mpf, Bismarck told the government of Belgium that:
While it was incumbent upon every state not to allow its terri-
tory to be a brsis of attack against the peace of neighboring states
and against the security of their subjects, the doctrine applied with
special force to a state enjoying the privilege of neutrality, that
the perfect fulfillment of that duty was a tactically preserved
°Sontag, England & Germany , p, 143
.
'Dugdale, ierman Doc iiments , p, 2, Prince Bismarck to Count von Arnim,
Paris, October 30, 1?73.
1873.
"Ibid., p, 2, Prince Bismarck to Count von Arnim, Paris. October 30,
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condition of its neutrality.
Undoubtedly, Bismarck felt that in France's isolated condition, bhsss
threats would have a great deal of effect. u;on her future policy. He
reasoned that England and Russia would I I 'nterfere because of religious
reasons. Both of these countries were Protestant and if anything, they
would Support his policy by remaining aloof to the whole situation. ^
Although Austria was Catholic, she too would not protest because of tv ^
importance of the Drgjj '" .iserbund to her 1 ty. With this situation,
B .smarck hoped to La lttsnos Trench policy by threatening her sway froa
aggressive moves, RowSTSTj as event3 happened, this policy threatened to
get out of hand. The nations of 'Europe, especially England and Russia felt
that he was endeavouring to force a quarrel upon his recent vict?\m before
12
liar recovery was complete, in order to crush her once and for all.
Therefore, instead of successfully bullying France 3i3marck wound up the
victim of his own plan, suspected and temporarily isolated in Europe.
In the beginning of 18?5, the situation took a more acute torn? alarm
was raised at the progress of the reforms in the French army. 5y the
Cadres Law of 1875, a new "fourth battalion" was created. Under this law,
units intsadsd to come into existence in the event of war, maintained a
permanent cadre on active duty. It was designed to prevent the disorganised
Windfrsd Taffs, "The War Scare Of 187$." The Slavonic and East
European Review . No. 335 (London: Eyre and Spotteswoode, Ltd., 1931),
p. 632.
Sontag, England & Germany , p. U|2«
11Tbid. ) p. li|2
12
Dugdale, German Documents , p. 2.
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conditions of the French reservas that hampered the army during the Franco-
13
Prussian War. Furthermore, an order was placed in Germany by the French
1Ugovernment for 10,000 cavalry horses, oisrciarck viewed the situation, as
serious and immediately prohibited the exnort of horses to France, The
German view of this situation is expressed clearly in a letter dated
April 11, 1875 from Count B&low, the Secretary of State to Count Munster,
German Ambassador in London:
Thero can be no doubt that the French ^ovemrrsnt plans for
putting the arr.gr into condition for striking extend far beyond the
needs of a peaceful policy and the material strength of the country.
This fact is the best explanation for the assumption by the foreign
*M that Germany is Making to renew its struggle with France, \$
/s soon as the "fourth battalion" was decided upon, the military party
in Germany betrayed much ation of which Count Moltke was the first to
give the signal* Speaking of "a savage cry for revenge from beyond the
Vcsgos," he urged the need for a preventive war against France, • Army
officers and newsmen talked of nothing but preventive war over their
beer mugs, end men in society gravely nodded their heads and said a ore-
17
ventive war was the height of political wisdom. The en, -e situation
was brought to a head by a series of newspaper articles which made war seem
almost inevitable. The first of these appeared in a German newspaper,
i-
Ko*lni3che Zeitung . A letter dated Vienna, April 5>, 1875 and headed "Hew
^Ibid., p. 2.
^Ibid.
, p. 2.
•
^Ibid , , p. 3, Count von BUlow, Foreign Minister, to Count Munster,
Paris, Ipril 11, l&Y:..
Robertson, Bisiriarck . p, 336, As quoted in. Seton Watson, Britain in
Europe
. p. 5>08.
^'Sontag, England & Germany , p. 1UU.
Alliances," argued that from the rocant great increases in military prepa-
ration and in particular the Cadres Law, and from the effort to establish
a clerical monarchy and a Catholic League against a Prussianised Germany,
lfi
inferred a direct preparation for a "War of Revenge," xo Immediately
following this article, on April 9, 1875 an article appeared in the Berlin
Post entitled "1st Per Krieg in Sicht?" (Is *tor in Sight?) For a long
tine it was believed to have been written by Bismarck but later evidence
confirmed that it was written independently by Constantino Rossler, editor
19
of the Post , It considered that the danger of a war of revenge was
imminent. It quoted, in support, Marshal MacMahon's demand to extend his
Presidentship for a period of at least ten years, as indicating a desire to
20
direct in person the war of revenge, as head of state. Tension was
further increased when on May 6, 1875 an article written by M, de Blowitz,
entitled, "A Fresh Scare," appeared in the Paris Times , This article gave
an account of a planned German invasion of France, According to the
article, the German armies were to invade France, crush all opposition
instantly, press on to Paris, invest the capitol, and take up positions on
the plateau of Araron, whence they could overlook Paris, and if need be
destroy it. This done, Germany would dictate a treaty reducing France to
absolute subjection for many years. It would insist on a permanently
reduced army, impose a war indemnity of 10, 000, COO, 000 (Ten milliards)
^"Dugdale, German Documents , p, 3.
197Ibid. % p, 3« In a speech to the Reichstag on February 9, 1876,
Bismarck discussed the article in the PoaT t "To my knowledge, I have never
had an article written for this paper and certainly not headed Krieg in
Sicht
. But, I have never found fault with it."
20Ibid., p. 5.
of Francs, payable in twenty annuities without any clause allowing payment
to be made in advance, with an annual interest rate at five per cent, and
keep garrisons in the principle towns of Prance until the whole sum would
21
be paid* Bismarck was also blaned as the sponsor of this article but
the author, M. de Blowitz maintained that he received his material from the
Due Deeazes. In the words of Blowitz:
After swearing I would never reveal the source till after the
death of Decazes, he produced a dispatch from the Viconte de Gontaut*
Biron, French Ambassador in Berlin. It was a detailed account of an
interview with M. de Radowitz, whom ha had met at a balls
Radowitz revealed to him the plans conceived against France by
the German 21ilitary Party. Such an indiscretion on his part, unless
it was committed by order, would have drawn serious punishment. But
who could possibly have ordered these indiscretions?. • .It was Prince
Bismarck. • .From his political point of view, that is, of the attitude
of England and Russia—such an enterprise might turn out to be most
disastrous for Germany...Prince Bismarck, therefore, thought that the
best way to cut short a project of which he himself was no longer the
master was to reveal it to official Surope and let the force of public
opinion take its course. 22
After this article, the French government turned for support to Russia
and England. General Leflo was dispatched to St. Petersburg to discuss the
situation, and Lord I^yons, British Ambassador to Paris, was briefed on the
situation. The French were successful. Leflo returned to France with the
Czar*s guarantee of peace and Lord I^yons reported to hie government that
France could not fight a war for ten years. She was only building up her
23
army for respect in the world.
As a result, there was a concentrated effort from all quarters to
2blowitz, Memoirs . p. 112
.
22Ibid., p. 112.
2
^Dugdale, German Documents, p. lu
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restrain Bismarck. • On I<!ay 10, 1875# the Czar of Russia and hio Chancellor,
Prince Gorchakov, were in Berlin, on the way to an annual cure at Eras, a: id
they threw their whole influence with the 2mperor in favor of peace, while
Lord Odo Russell, British Ambassador to Berlin, received instructions to
intervene along similinr lines, p Qu«en Victoria wrote a latter to the
Emperor /illiam in which she stressed her friendship toward him, her
attachment to Germany, and urged upon him a policy of magnanimity and
26
generosity towards France.
On May 10, 1875 informal conferences wer* held at the Wilhelmstrasse
first with Lord Odo Russell of England and later with Prince Gorchakov of
Russia, At these conferences 3ismarck stressed the peaceful intentions of
Germany, The results are axpressed clearly in a cypher telegram from Lord
Odo Russell to Lord Derbyi "Berlin, Kay 11, 1875—-1 have had a most satis-
factory interview with Prince Gorchakov and ?rinco Bismarck, They are both
agreed that the peace of Europe shall not be dist'irbod, and co-operate for
the maintenance of peace." '
Gorchakov received the most recognition out of the conference and was
credited with placing a public slight upon the German Chancellor in his own
2iiSeton totson, Britain in Europe , p, 509,
2
*Ibid,, p. 509.
"George Eerie Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria . 6 vols., 1870-
1878. (London: 'John Murray, Albermarle Street w, 1926;, II, 313- Queen
Victoria to Emperor William. Osborne, February 10, 1875*
2??aff3, The War Scare of 1875 . p. 6U1. Cypher telegram from Lord
Odo Russell to Lord Derby, 3erlin, May 11, 1875.
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cep.1tol by announcing that "now peace is assi:red." ° After the conference
took place all rumors of war ceased, Europe returned to normal. There was
one lasting result however, and that was resentment on the part of Bismarck
towards Gorchakov. Said the Iron Chancellor:
I reproached Qorchakov sharply. It was not I said, a friendly
part suddenly and unexpectedly to jump on the back of a trustful and
uns:spectirg friend, and get up a circus performance at his costj
proceedings of ohis kind between us, who were the directing ministers,
could only injure the two monarchies and states. If he was anxious to
be applauded in Paris, he need not on that account injure our relations
with Russia. I was quite lesdy to assist him. • .we might also set up a
theater in the German embassy, where he could appear before a French
audience with the same inscription in the character of a guardian angel,
dreaded in white with wings, to the accompaniment of Bengal fire. 2°
The resentment with which Bismarck regarded his former teacher because
of his vain role as peacemaker in 1675, led to a deterioration in their
relations} and it in part explains the reason for Bismarck's choice of
30
supporting Austria instead of ttussia before and at the Congress of Berlin.
The Iron Chancellor was not the man to forget a bad turn and still less a
31humiliation as he had received from Qorchakov in his own capitol. 0m
The question that roust now be raised is did Bismarck actually have
intentions of war against France in 1875? Did he actually desire such a
preventive war as he was accused of in the early montns of 1673? Bismarck
emphatically denied that he had any intention of attacking France. In his
2&As quotea in: William Flavelle Monypenny and George Earle Buckle, The
Life of Benjarrdn Disraeli. U vols. (New York: The >fecraillian Company,
wSr$ it, for
2?Butler, Bismarck, p. 1°1.
3°Anna Augusta r/hittall iiamsay. Idealism and Foreign Policy. (London:
John Murray, Albemarle Street, 192$), p. 379.
3*Coolidge, Origins of the Alliance , p. 63.
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memoirs he s ta tes :
fa | I from enterta? . j S"ch ide; lj or a "ter-
wards, that I would rather have resigned than lent a hand in picking a
quarrel, which could 1 bive than pr . -ace
from recovering her breath and strength, A war of this kind could
j LoDj Ltd to permanent 1,,-, tenable coi i.n
Europe, but might have brought about an agreement between Russia,
based opoo rr.is '. - 9 1 i leadin.; ev j ntually
to active proceedings against the new and unconsolidated emoire. 32
Bismarck placed the blame for the war scare on Moltke and the military
factor in Germany, the alarmists articles that appeared in the French and
German press, and the Due Decazus. He made a scapegoat of Moltke by stating
that, "Moltke took a military and strategic view of the question and did
not consider the political side of it| his opinions were purely based on a
mathematical calculation, irrespective of other considerations." *3 Bismarck
emphatically denied all connection with the articles that appeared in the
press. Rather, Bismarck said that Decazes was responsible for much of
the scare because of his engagement in large speculation on the Bourse.
However, despite Bismarck's statements, the I'act remains that in tne
years before the crises of 1873' he had used threats against France based
partly upon fear of French mj-litary reorganizations and partly upon French
and Belgium protests against the Kulturkampf . it was ai30 Known tnat tne
possibilities of a preventive war against France were real, ihe question
is was the greater danger from Bismarck or the German military party?
™
•
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-uuier, Bisnai-cK. p. 193«
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-^-as quoted in: Lord Augustus Loitus, ihe Diplomatic Reminiscence ox" Lord
Augustus Loftua. 6 vols. (London, Paris k Melbourne, lF9u), VI, 11L.
jiiSatcn tfatson, Britain in Fhirope
. p. 510.
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A letter written by Admiral Albricht Stoach to hia friend Freytag on
April 22, 1675 reveals considerable insight into this situation*
I was astonished to find a martial mood here when 1 returned after
throe weeks absence, I lay no weight at all on the sensational article
and motives. I belie /e that the Chancellor had only the intention of
showing France we were not afraid and tbfl Belgiums that talk of the
devil makes him appear. However, here danger is seen everywhere.
There is no appreciation of such a calm standpoint, tfisnarck was sick,
and I could not get any certain information. Then yesterday, the
Chancellor gathered us (the State Ministry) together at a session.
His cold was apparent, but he was unusually active in spirit and in
good mood. I can tell you that we will remain at peace. 36
This meeting was held two days aftor publication of the Post article,
w Ist tier Krieg in Cicht?" Here Bismarck assured his cabinet that there
must be no war. *nis event took place before pressure was brought to bear
on Bismarck from England and Russia. The indication that can be drawn here
is that Bismarck, in the Spring of 1875# had no intentions of attacking
France but thore were many in Germany who felt that this would be the
desirable policy.
Count Suburov, the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, also throws new light
on the subjoct. He 3aid in his memoirs: "It was not against France but
against the military of the two countries that he bore grudge. If one let
them do as they liked, the charge of these burning questions were so that he
37had determined to bring them within the area of diplomatic explanation."
Baron Holstain also defends Bi3marck in this situation. He made the
following statement in his iremoirs:
I am fully convinced that Prince Bismarck had no thought what-
^Frederick B. Hollyday, Bismarck *s Rival
.
(Durham* Duke University
Press, 1°60), p. 117. Letter from Admiral von Stosch to Freytag, April 22,
1875.
3?As quoted in: Taffs, The War Scare of 1875. p. 6U3.
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ever of going to war. Not only are there no definite signs of such an
intent, but later on, in every case waon war really did seem possible,
Prince Bismarck showed a most zealous love of peace. He used to say,
"You know where war begins but you never know how or tfhere it ends, 11 38
The conclusion tnat may be drEwn from tnis incident is that Bisjiarck
saw la the reariwaruent of IfranM a new potential threat to t::e peace the
German Empire needed. A strong Franca might break away from the ancnor of
isolationism and under Marshal ifacKahon and Decazes, lead a Catholic
coalition against Protestant Germany. Therefore, wnile the opportunity
existed, he had x.o attempt to prevent France from Decerning too aggressive.
This could be done by threats of a preventive war. In this incident,
Bismarck's fear of a hostile coalition promoted his actions. However, in
1875, when sabres began to rattle and France apoealed to world opinion,
Bismarck had to abandon his threatening attitude, and accept the humility
of negotiations with Lord Odo Russell and Prince Oorchakov. As a result of
this policy Bismarck became the object of suspicion and distrust in the
courts of Europe. However, peace was maintained, the Dreikaiserbimd still
intact, and although France did not have to worry about a "German preventive
War," neither did Bismarck have to worry about a French war of revenge, or
a French-led coalition against Germany.
^Norman F.ich and H. H. Fisher, (ed), The Holatein Papers. The Kemo:
lie.ries and Corresorndence of Friedrich vonllclstein, 3 vcjs. (Cambridge
>
University Press), "Memoirs & Political Observations." II, 117.
CHAPTER in
conplictj.no iffflLkun
The War Scare of 187? Had hardly srbalded when a rerolt occurred in
Bosnia-Herse ;oYina. Soon, Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria nad taken up
the sword egpinst their Turkish masters. The intervention of Russia,
followed by the Russo-T.irkish Kar and the Treaty of San Stefanc, brought
Europe within measurable distance of a European conflagration. This situ-
ation soon proved to be as critical to the Bismarckian system aa the Greek
insurrection had been to Metternich^ Holy Alliance in Ib22-l830. The
crisis not only posed a threat to European peace but also threatened Austrian
and Russian collaboration in the area, endangering the Dreikaiserbund—the
heart of Bismarck's European diplomacy. At his country estate at Varain,
Bismarck, satisfied that Qermany had escaped a hostile coalition as a result
of the sfer Scare, now anxiously watched events in the Balkans. True, Germany
at this time had no interests in the East, but an Austrian, Russian clash
over this area could harmfully weaken the Dreikaiserbund, and divide the
continent into ostile camps.
The Ottoman Empire held large tracts of Asia and Africa as well as Europe
in the fifteenth end sixteenth centuries. It was feared by European leaders
of every degree. The flood of Ottoman conquests had twice carried the Turks
to the gates of Vienna, but since the beginiiing of the Eighteenth Century, the
2
Turkish dominion in Europe had been restricted to the Balkan Peninsula.
^Robertson, Bismarck , p. 33o.
^Monypenny and Buckles, Disraeli. II, p« 877.
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While the Turks woru still a conquering race, t,he empire was well governed,
taxation was light, and the subject races had little cause fcr complaint.
But the Turkish conquests >rere never thoroughly consolidated, Turks,
Slavs and Greeks dwelt together side by side but were never fused into one
nation, 3 Accordingly, when the heritage or Solyman the Magnifici^t
passed in !5o6 to ft eorj.38 of incompetent successors, there was a rapid
decay* *
Until 187^, moat of the Balkan Peninsula from the Adriatic Sea and frtH
the Mediterranean to the Southern frontiers of Austria and Russia, with
the exception of Qreece, was under the direct control of the Sultan, or of
a vassal status, Qreece still looked forward to the time when Thea3aly and
Epirus would become Qreecian territory, Serbia and Jlontenegro had been
Principalities since 1830, and Rouraania since 1861, but they were still
vassal states. The Sultan directly controlled Bulgaria, Roumelia, Bosnia
Herzegovina, Albania, Thessaly, Zpirus, Thrace and Macedonia, ^
Within the centrally governed provinces, there existed great diversity
both of race and religion. Those of Moslsm faith escaped oppression, but
systematical!,, ;3ed their neighbors. Christians were deprived of
liberties and rights of citizenship, equality before the law was unknown,
small peasant holdings were discouraged by the land-laws, and taxation was
everywhere arbitrary, exorbitant and ruthlessly enforced. Premises of
3Ibid,, p. 877.
^Ibid,, n, 678.
^3ir A, W, Ward and G. P. Gooch, The Ccnbridgo History of British
?oreirn °clicr
. h vols,, 1783-1919. (Ca^brid-et University Press,
iy23;, III, yl.
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reform became exasperating in their multiplicity and insincerity. Cor-
ruption and inefficiency at the center of government produced corruption
and oppression throughout the provxnces. i sis government rekindled the
national spirit of the oppressed peoples, and insurrection and rev Its,
7
often successful, were the inevitable outcome*
Since 1856, and the aiming of the Treaty of Paris, which ended the
Crimean ,Jar, Turkey had enjoyed unusual calm. Unhappily, the oliarter of
1856, which called for reforms not only in Turkey itself but in the Turkish
provinces as well, had remained on paper. Outside of anqy reforms and
central government reconstitution, there had been no reforms. Instead, tht
a
cancer of inefficiency had eaten deeper into the body politik * Turkey
was headed by Abdul Aaia, a cruel and grossly incompetent tyrant. The
statesmen of real caliber whom Turkey had possessed in the 1850's had been
replaced oy medeocritea. On top of this fact, Turkish finances had ^one
from bad to worse. After a series of nine foreign loans between 185U end
9
1875» bankruptcy was imminent.
For four centuries, Bosnia-^ieraegGvina had formed a little world of
its own, isoi from the main iialkan trade routes, ruled by a small group
of Koslewiaed feudal Beg?, deeply divided in religion between Orthodox,
Catholic and Moslem, and in the nineteenth century, racked by periodical
revolt. The year I87lt was marked by a crop failure in. Herzegovina, but
6Ibid., p. 91.
'Monyper.-y Fnd Duckies, Dxsraeli . II, p. 877.
^Seton vfatson, Britain in ?urope . p. 512.
?Ibid., p« 512.
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taxes were as oppressive as ever. In this year, the Emperor of Austria
made a visit to Balruatia. ixcited by the Emperor's visit, and Incensed at
tax oppression, the civilians of a small town in Herzegovina rose in re-
bellion, July 1875. All efforts of the Turks to suppress it foiled. The
Sultan appealed to the powers as a bankrupt, and declared his inability
to pay his debt or the interest on them, ^ The powers intervened in the
interest of peace, but still the Herze^ovians fought on. They refused to
lay down their arms until assured of reforms.
During the Spring of 1876, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Bulgaria
joined in the revolt. On May 2, the smoldering embers burst into flame and
the Bulgarians, encouraged by the success in Herzegovina, and assisted by
Roumelia, rose in rebellion. ** To suppress this uprising, as insisted
upon by the powers and to make reprisals for the murder of the local Turkish
officials, the Sultan let loose upon the inhabitants an ill-disciplined
army of half-civilized Bashi Bazouks. i2 It was in the mountainous district
around Philipopolis, in the country afterwards known as Eastern Rumelia,
that the uprising had first occurred, and it was here that the massacres
and outrages that had marked the insurrection were avenged a hundredfold.
Thousands perished and many villages were ravaged and destroyed. Peculiarly
heinous atrocities were perpetrated in the hill town of Batak; every house
IQlbid., p. 512.
•^Lord L. L. D. Acton, Cambridge Modern History . Ik vols. The Latest
Age
. (\T3w Tork: T'r: I Lilian Company, 1910), TBt 1?5.
**lftarl ?nd Gooch, ?rltlah ^srsigr. ^olicj
. p. 95. Bashi ?; *ere
soldiers gathered from the wildest districts of Turkey and the lowest haunts
of the cities cf the Turkish Empire.
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In it was burnt, and 5*000 people slaughtered, neither age nor sex
13being spared, **
Four days after the revolt la Bulgaria, a mob of fanatical Tor
murdered tho French and German Consuls at Salonica, This event, coupled
with the previous revolt and atrocities, led the powers to believe uhat the
Porte had lost complete control in the matter. It was here that the Berlin
Memorandum was drawn tip for a two months armistice in which the belligerents
should attempt to arrive at an understanding, and further reforr.s, rest of
which were outlined by the Andrassy note. The memorandum was telegraphed
to the powers for approval on May 13* 1876, and en i*m<ediate reply was
15
urped, Italy ant* France acquiesced but England declined, England's
refusal to join the powers led the Porte to believe England favored nim.
As a result he refused to accept the demands rade by the powers in the
Berlin Memorandum,
As a result of hia refusal to accept negotiations, Serbia and Mcnte-
16
negro declared war on July 1 and 2, ' The Porte, after having crushed the
Bulgarians, was now free to face the Serbs with the majority of his force.
At this time, thousands of Russian volunteers flocked to the Serbian
standards, and the supreme command was assigned to the Russian General
Chemagev. Despite this assistance, Serbia's offensive socn failsd. In
-^Monypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . II, p, 913.
^Ioid., p, 913.
^Great dritain, British and Foreign State Papers , Vol. iJCVII, (London:
William Ridway, 169 Piccadilly, lPb'5), P. 123>i. tetFer #rom the *!prl ^
Deroy to Lord Jdo Ruaa«ll in i'epiy tu Berlin Memorandum, May 19, 1676,
^ibid,, p, XI&. Letter froia Odo Hussell to the Karl of Derby, July
3, 1876':
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the first week of August, the Turks captured Kujasevac and ZeJ60ai*j and
advancing steadily, inflicted a severe defeat on the Serb? on Sortember 1,
17
l p76 at the Bftttla of Alekaivac. ' Overwhelmed and exhausted, Princ? Milan
appealed for intervention by the powers. Finally, on Nove"nber 1, 1876.,
Russia by means of a threat, secured a two months armistice lor Serbia and
Montenegro. It was later extended to March l p 1577. Before the armistice
expired, Serbia made peace with Turkey on the basis of the 3tatus quo
,
18
February 28, 1877.
Montenepro had been more successful in the war than had Serbia. They
had managed to inflict some serious losses on the Turks. During the armi-
stice, peace negotiations were carried on with the Porte. However, these
proved fruitless because the victorious Montenegrians ask»d cession of
territory.
After the failure of the Constantinople Conference, held December 21,
I876, the London Protocol was proposed. It urged the Porte to list the
reforms that he expected to carry out. The powers would then determine if
they were satisfactory, observe their progress through their diplomatic
representatives, and if disappointed, consider common measures for enforcing
19 20
them. The Porte Immediately rejected this plan and Russia declared war.
17
'R. V. Seton Watson, " *cusso British Halations During the Eastern Crises."
The Slavonic ana East European Review. Vol. IV, No. 10. (London: Eyre and
Spotteswoode, Ltd., 1925), p. 177.
18
British State Papers , p. 610. Note by British Foreign Office.
^Ramsay, foreign Policy , p. 390.
°Benedict Humphrey Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1937), p. 271.
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The rejection of the Protocol of* London was, according to Russian ideas, a
21defiance of a unanimous Europe by the Porte. In a circular of April 19,
1877* Prince Gorchakov announced to Europe that the Csar hai given orders
22
for his armies to cross the frontiers of Turkey. Russia would intervene
alone, in the interest of Europe, and force upon Turkey the terms of peace
23
that the European concert had failed to do. Immediately preparations were
made for another military campaign, but not until April 29, 1877> five days
after Russia declered war on Turkey, did hostilities reopen.
Prior to this action, Russia realised that the key to her action in
the Balkans depended upon an agreement with the Hapsburg Er.pira. Experi-
ence during the Crimean War had shown that the Austrian army could threaten
Russian land communications and make it dsngerous for her to engage in
operations in Roumania or on the Danube. With this in mind, Alexander II
and Franz Joseph met at the Castle of Reichstadt, and concluded an agreement
which would be a guiding principle in the advent of a break-up of Turkey.
According to the agreement, Bulgaria, Rumelia and Albania would b6 erected
into autonomous or independent states, and under no conditions was a large
Slavic state to be created. Serbia and Montenegro were to be allowed a
common frontier in the Sanjak of Nov! Pazar, Bosnia and Herzegovina were
to be annexed by Austria, and Russia was to be allowed to regain the
21Ibid., p. 2?0.
22
British State Papers . Vol, LXVIII, p. 8'jJ., RnMiaa circular of
April 19, 1579 to the Foreign Offices of Europe.
**A full tact of the London Protocol may be seen la Sumner, Russia
and the Balkans. Appendix IV, p. 605-613.
2hActon, Modern History . XIT, p. 338.
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Besserabian territory, that she haa lost in lc!f>6, which would brinr her
2$
frontiers to the Danube. This a<Te«ment was sicked July 8, 187^. The
terms of the cjrccr.cr.t were later incorporated Into the Treaty of Budapest,
January 15, 1877. rt is inter? ytin? to Dote, that In return for ^-'strian
neutrality, Russis promised to confine her activities to the Eastern half
of the Balkan Peninsula, and recogniaed the interests of Austria in the
26
Western half. On Russia' 8 insistence the treaty Had kept secret btcauce
it was inconsistent with Russia's claim to be liberator of the oppressed
Slav people. Their trust in her sincerity would be shattered if they knew
27
she had transferred Slav people fro-* one captivity to another. '
On April ZUf 1877 the Russian army was ordered to cross the Turkish
frontier. The Grand Duke Nicholas issued theso words to sustain thai?
morale: "Ve are called upon to execute the will of the sovereign and tne
sacred legacy of our fathers. It is not towards conquest that we march,
it is to defend our insulted ana oppressed brothers, to defend the faith
op
of Christ." w Was it to be a crusade? The soldiers so considered it. On
the other hand, the Caar had told the Grand Duke that Constantinoole was
29
hi3 obloct. Thus the Russians had two ideas in entering the war.
Contrary to expectations, the Russian armies failed to "promenade"
"Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia k Balkan Nationalism . ( Berkley &
Los Angles: University of California J'reos, 195ti) 9 p. U.
Ibid., p. li.
*'Acton,
~ f
odcrr. History , p. J89«
28
As quoted In I atrial Jlar.ctfiux, >;qt. temporary franca , trans. S. 3psrvel
Bayly. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909), p. 291.
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Ibid., p. 291. Onou, The Memoirs of Count N. Ignatyev. p. 115.
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through the BaLka^s, Roumani? joined ^ussis on June 3 f and at the same
30
time, declared her independence from Turkey. ' Montenegro had declared
var on April ?9. VJith thnsR allies Russia didj daring the fir-it two
months, seem to have an easy path to Constantinople. However, when
Chum Pasha assumed contmand of the Turkish forces, thfl Turkish rrnv halted
31
the rush. At Plevna, the 'lurks held out until December 10. At this
time the Turkish resistance collapsed And the Porte b<?gan peace negotiations
with Rusjia.
England became alarmed at this time at the fact that even though
negotiations warn underway, the Russian amy was advancing towards
Constantinople. On January 3> she ordered her fleet to the -jardcnelles,
but en January 2U» word was received from Constantinople that an under-
standing had been reached between the belligerents and that the question
of the Strait* should be settled betveen the Congress and the Emperor of
Russia, The Cabinet, thinking that now the Russians would halt, counter-
32
manded the order. Still, the Russian array continued to advance. The
Russc-Balkan Far threatened to break out into a new, larger conflict.
An intense war spirit arose in England and the signing if the Armistice
on January 3.1, 1678 between the belligerents did not reduce the war -Sever.
The Armistice recognized the occupation by Russia of practically the
whole of Turkey in Europe. Since the fall of Plevna on Deoeaber 10, 18??,
33
^British 3tr*.s Paters. V:l. LXVIIJj p. 67?U67#» Declaration of
Roumanian Independence June 3> 1677»
Sunner, Rasila and the Balkqn-s . p. 3!/l.
•^onvpenny and Buckles, Disraeli , 71$ p. 230,
3%ard and Gooch, British Foreign Policy , p. 123.
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the Russian troops had steadily advanced. While the delegates from the two
belligerents were negotiating a basis of peace, the Russian soldiery entered
Adrianople. It should seem that now, since the armistice was signed, the
Russian advance should be stopped, but it was not. ** All ap^earancei
35pointed to a Russian occuoation of Constantinople. ** The English fleet
was again ordered to Constantinople but was stoooed a second tine, not
36by English orders, but by Turkish. ** The Grand Duke Nicholas had announced
that if the British Fleet entered the Dardanelles, he would enter Constant-
inople. The Sultan had appealed to the British governrent not to permit
the fleet to continue its .journey. When the fleet appeared at the entrance
of the Dardanelles it was stopped by the Governor of Gallipoli, who said
37he had orders to oppose its passage. In London, Lord Salisbury wrote to
Lord Beaconsfield, "if the fleet once more returns to Besika Bay, our
position will be utterly ridiculous. We shall disgust our friends and lose
3ft
all weight in Europe. w He ur ed immediate orders to be sent to the fleet
to proceed by force. The fourth order in three weeks was then sent to
39
the fleet. It was to move forward and if fired upon, to "return the fire."
^Konypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . VI, p. 2Ul»
"Acton, Modern History , p. 123.
^•lonypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . VI, o. 21*2. Lord Beaconsfield to
Lady 3radford, February 7, MEl
37
•^'Alexe' tdtr Cnou, "The Memoirs of Count N. Ign&tyev." The Slavonic
and East European Review . Vol. II, (London: 6 Great News Street, Eyre &
S-)otteswoode Ltd., 1932-33), p. 115.
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Lady Gwendolyn OmSJLj Life cf tobgrt crcuis of Salisbury . It vols.
1668-1680, (London: Hodder & Stoughton Limited) II, 197. Lord Salisbury
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An outburst of anger in Petrojrad greeted this movement of the British
fleet. The Grand Duke Nicholas received orders that if English ships
appeared in the Bosporus, his troops should at once enter the capitol, ^
Nevertheless, the British stood firm and on February 15, the English
ironclads anchored before the Golden Horn. **
Count Ignatyev reached the Russian army shortly after the armistice
was signed, ^* He urged the Grand Duke to seize Constantinople as ordered, **
The Grand Duke Nicholas replied: "The order came too late, \Telidev hai
already come to terms with the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, and I had already
agreed and could not change it. Besides, I had to give the troops a rest
and give time for the artillery to come up to the units." ••
Later, by special agreement with Turkey, the Russian headquarters were
established at San Stefano, a suburb of Constantinople, within the neutral
aone established by the armistice. The British fleet voluntarily withdrew
to a position close to Prince's Isle in the Sea of Marmora, and anchored
in the Gulf of Bursa, m9 Under those conditions, the "English Whale" end
the "Russian Bear" faced each other for six months, ^
It was in this situation that the Treaty of San Stefano was signed
k°Onou, The Kemolrs of Count N. Ignatyev
. p. 113.
^Ibid., p. 113.
u Count Ignatyev was Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, and author
of the Treaty of San Stefano.
Ibid
., p. 111.
^As quoted in: Onou, The Memoirs of Count N, Ignatyev , p. 111.
^Cecil, Life of Salisbury , p. 199,
^Ibid., p. 199.
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March 2, 1876. During the secret negotiations, Rueaia did not rely on
the assistance of Europe, On the contrary, she resented interference and
fenced the Forte to a hasty conclusion by continually drawing the cordon
of Russians tighter around the Turkish cepitol. On /arcr, 7, Xo/B the
provisions of the treaty were officially published in Europe. A wave cf
shock went over the nations of Europe. In the words of Lord Beaccnsfield,
LB
the dominion of the Ottoman Empire is abolished in Europe. *7 Ignatytv,
Russian ambassador at Constantinople incorporated the hop as ta4 aspiratic 5
of Russian opinion, particularly of the Panslav element, into the terms of the
treaty. Basically, its provisions were: (1) The independence of ikntenegro
was reaffirmed and Serbia and Roumania were likewise recognized as independent
principalities. (2) Serbia and Montenegro were to receive additional terri-
tory. (3) Rcumania was to return lower Bessarabia to Russia and recoive
Dobruja in exchange. In addition to lower Bessarabia, Russia wa3 to acquire
an increase of territory in Transcaucasia. (!*) An autonomous Bul ~ria was
to be erected, under the national nuzorainity of Turkey, which was to cc.ipose
the greater part of European Turkey. A Russian commission was to be ap-
pointed to advise and supervise the government for two years, mad a Russian
army of occupation would remain for the same period. (5) Russia wojld be
paid a war indemnity, and Turkey would destroy all forts along the Danube.
(6) The Straits would be open to the commerce of all nations in time of
7
A published text of this treaty may be seen in Sumner, Russia and
the Balkans . Appendix VII, p. 627-636.
k6Cecil, Life of Salisbury . 0. 199.
^7Konypanny and Buckle, Disraeli . VT, p. 2I18. Lord Beaconsfield to
Queen Victoria, February 16, IBTo^
hh
peace and in war to merchant ships of neutral states arriving from and bound
to Russian ports.
To the Russians, the Treaty of San Stefano was the fulfillment of a
dream; to England and Austria it meant a check to their vital interests
and was contrary to the Treaty of Reichstadt, To Prince Bismarck it meant
a threat of war, and an end to the Pre ikaiserbund, and an end to peace
that Germany needed. The solution to the problem—the Congress of Berlin.
As early as 18S>3> the powers of Europe realised that the Ottoman Empire
was crumbling. On January 9» 1853 Csar Nicholas I had said to Sir
Hamilton Seymour, "We have a very sick man on our hands, and it would be a
great misfortune if he shouli escape us, especially before all the necessary
dispositions," ** Who would be an heir to the sick old man of Europe led
many of the European statesmen to revaluate their foreign policies to see
what could be gained from his death, Austria, Russia and England all
found that they had very vital interests in the Balkans, and in the years
from the Crimean War until the crisis of the First World's War in 191U,
geared their Balkan policies to these ends,
Austria had much to gain in the Balkans, and much to lose from Russian
dominance there. Since 1866 Austria was excluded from further participation
in German affairs, and in the same period, found herself unable to embark
on an overseas adventure in pursuit of colonies. Thus, the Balkan Peninsula
$2
became the only field open to imperial expansion. Certainly, the dream
-^Jelavich, Tsarist Russia , p, £•
As quoted in: Monypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . II, p. 1338,
9 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia, p, 2.
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FttUcan Peninsula to 3rloi\ica Mi •'ttrastivG, At this tlna, Av,?tri« -ould
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fr in though Russia made advances in the middle Kfist, the Ds^': r n roblera
hrd riMd I the center of. Rursinn foreign policy for 150 year?. The
Crivtecn Wnr had baaa a serious setbeok to this policy but since throwing
off the shncklas of the Treaty of Paris during the Franco-Prussian MtfTj she
had once again resroied her old position. Her chief goal was control of the
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Straits and Constantinople, the key to Russia's Mbaek door". All Balkan
interests were subordinated to the problem of the Straits. 56
To accomplish this task, Russia had much in her favor. First, there
was the Pan-Slavic ideal of the unity of the Slavs against the encroachment
of the West. On this ground she could gain much support from the Balkan
peoples, who had been conditioned to religious and ideological struggles
for centuries of Moslem rule. On this basis she attracted Serbia, Bulgaria,
and Montenegro. Secondly, Russia posed as the center of the Greek Orthodox
religion. The Orthodox Church could be used to enlist the aid of Roumania
and Greece. ?l These natural advantages gave Russia the inside track over
her ether rivals.
Under the influence of Count Ignatyev, the Russians aimed at the
creation of a new Bulgarian state which would serve as a strong advance
post toward the Straits and at the same time offer a point of attraction to
the other Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula. With this understanding then,
when the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, Russia felt as though her century
old drean had been fulfilled.
England was just as concerned with events in the Balkans as was Austria
and Russia. In the early part of the Nineteenth Century, Britain had come
to realize how important the Near East and the Caliphate at Constantinople
was to a power which was established in India and ruled over a large number
56Ibid . t p. 1.
^7Ibid
., p. 1.
-^onypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . II, p. 860.
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of Mohammedan subjects. It was at this time that they also saw that the
number one enemy to Turkey was Russia. Thenceforth, British policy became
aimed at thwarting Russian moves against the Turk. The classic example of
this was Palmers ton during the Crimean War. Thus, the Treaty of Paris,
which concluded the war, made the support of the Turkish Empire a British
principle.
The Conservative party came to power in lC7lw A new spirit in the
conduct of foreign affairs was at once apparent. The hesitating policy of
Gladstone was supplanted by the vigorous one of Disraeli. The "Little
Englanders" gave way to "Imperialists." Almost immediately upon entering
the foreign office, the Conservative government embarked upon a program
of colonial consolidation. Disraeli made a sensational purchase of the
bankrupt Khedieve's share in the Suez Canal. (1675) Queen Victoria was
crowned Empress of India on January 1, 1877 to impress upon the Hindus the
idea of a personal sovereign. Finally, the Transvaal and Orange Free
States were annexed. To Disraeli, the Eastern Question was as important
now as it was in the days of Palmerston. In fact, Bismarck stated that the
Sues Canal was to England like the spinal cord which connects the backbone
with the brain. The very thought of Russia in control of Constantinople
%bid
., p. 879.
6oIbid., p. U39.
6lIbid.
, p. U39.
62Ibid., p. U56.
°^Morit» Busch, Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of his History . 2 vols.
(New York: The Macmillian Company, 189b), II, 322.
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would be a serious blow to the British Empire. They could nob afford to
allow the. Mediterranean to become a Russian lake as it would if Russia
controlled the Straits* The question then was how to defend the empire*
Disraeli based his dealings with the Eastern Question on the London
Conference of 1871. This conference was held after Oorchakov denounced
the 31ack Sea Clause of the Treaty of Paris, and proclaimed that the Caar
6k
would reserve his "sovereign rights'* in those waters. ^ The Treaty of
Paris was upheld with the exception of the naval force on the Black Sea.
It was on the Treaty of Paris thus revised by the Conference of London that
6S
Disraeli took his stand on the Eastern Question*
It is now apparent why Disraeli took the course he followed, as the
Russian armies closed in on Constantinople* This also explains why after
the Treaty of San Stefano was announced that he mads these statements in his
speech in the House of Lords:
The Treaty of San Stefano completely abrogates Turkey in Europe;
it abolishes the dominion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe; it creates
a large state who, under the name of Bulgaria was to have a Prince
virtually selected by Russia, and administered and supervised by
Russia, and a garrison furnished for two years by Russia. ..all of the
European dominions of the Ottoman are taken, and for that power is
substituted Russia herself. The same would be of Turkey in Asia.
Batum, a port on the Black Sea, which was not captured by the Russians,
Was to be taken from Turkey* The Black Sea would be as much a Russian
lake as the Caspian* Bessarabia, which was taken from Russia to
protect the navigation of the Danube, was again restored to Russia* The
control of the Straits would again be under Russian domination* 66
In Disraeli's eyes, the Treaty of San Stefano had to be set aside, and
it is toward this goal that he directed his energies at the Congress of
6i
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Berlin,
Thus, Austrian, English and Russian interests clash over t5ie Eastern
Question, With the English fleet opposite the Russian Arrry at Constantinople
and with Austria threatening to mobilize her army in aid of England, the
threat to peace is very much evident. It is with this situation that Bismarck
is faced in the years I876-I878, and it is this situation that must be
solved by the Congress of Berlin,
CHAPTER IV
THE ROAD TO THE CONGRESS
As events in the Balkans continued to move from one crisis to another
between the ^rears 1875-1877 this question might be asked. What mm the
attitude of Prince Bismarck and what role did he play in the diplomatic
negotiations that cook place? His attitudes and actions are best divided
into four different periods. From the beginning of the Balkan Crisis until
December 1875* he was unconcerned. In December 1875* he moved from this
policy to one of action. His fear of becoming isolated forced him to init-
iate negotiations with Britain, Tne third phase began in April 1876,
The position taken by the Iron Chancellor at this time was a return to his
policy of disinterest and aloofness. Finally, in 1878, whan Russian
armies were encamped on the outskirts of Constantinople, end the British
fleet anchored within sight of them, his attitude changed to an immediate
desire to solve the problem through an international congress, A close
look at the details surrounding these years will point this out.
While resting at his estate in Varzin, Bismarck first heard the news
of the Balkan insurrection. At first little attention was paid to the
situation. He was more concerned with mapping out his internal war against
the National Liberals and evaluating the success of his Kulturkampf , In
fact, Bismarck for a short time welcomed the situation. This attitude is
clearly revealed in a letter to the Emperor William I dated August 13, 1875:
The Turkish question can hardly assume large proportions if the
three imperial courts remain united,, .moreover, it can only be of
advantage to us if public attention and the policy of other powers
51
should, for a while, be directed elsewhere than to the Franco-German
question. 1
Bismarck had no regrets that the revolt had taken place. He hated
the Turks with a true Lutheran contempt and he believed that the peoples
2
of the Balkans would some day break from their Turkish masters. He did
not feel that war between Austria and Russia would come, and if Russia
became aggressive, Britain would intervene to prevent them from being
too successful. *
Therefore, from the beginning of complications in the Zast he kept
aloof as far as possible. Kis chief effort as expressed by Bulow, Foreign
Minister, in a dispatch on December eighth, 1875 to Alvensleben, Charge
d f Affaires at St. Petersburg, centered in the maintenance of the Drei-
kaiserbund, with its basis of freedom of action, and in adherence to the
joint decisions and actions of Russia and Austria combined. Bismarck
expressly discouraged any inclination to influence in any direction the
development of affairs in Turkey. ^ in a memorandum on November 9, 1876
he said, "If the Smperor Alexander II makes war on Turkey, it will do us
no harm, and if he is allowed to act without interference, it is to the
advantage of the general peace." ^ On November 10, he wrote Bulow: "Our
attitude will be 3imiliar to that of Russia on the situation of 1870, and
^Busch, Bismarck , p. >27. Letter from Bismarck to Emperor William I*
Varzin, August 15, 1875.
2
Taylor, Bismarck , p. 168.
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52
further that we are gratified at the peaceful intentions of Russia towards
Austria, (Treaty of Reichstadt) I am grateful for the communication and
ready to offer our services."
Again, on December 18, 1875 he said to his guests: "The immediate
future was free from care; the only cloud in the skies, little Herzegovina
could not disturb Germany •" ' Bismarck's attitude towards the Eastern
Question was again brought out in December 1876, when he made the statement
"Germany had no interest in the Eastern Question, that was worth the
8
healthy bones of a Pomeranian musketeer. M It appeared as though Bismarck
attempted to adopt an attitude of amicable detachment during the early
9
period of the conflict.
In Bismarck's mind, the Hear Eastern Question could work well for
Germany provided that a war which would dissolve the Dreikaiserbund could
be averted. Also, no action which would result in a Russian, Austrian and
French alliance against Germany could be taken. In fact, Germany possibly
could hope to gain in the long run by a movement of the interests of
Russia and Austria and their mutual rivalries towards the East. Further-
more, Russia would be impelled to take up a strong defensive position in
the East, and on her own shores, thus forcing her to stand in need of the
German alliance. There was also a strong possibility that a wedge could
be driven between England and France over the Egyptian and Mediterranean
°Ibid
., p. 37 • Prince Bismarck to von Bulow, November 10, 1676.
7
As quoted in: David Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis
of 1S75-1678 . (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1936),
p. 171.
Q
As quoted in: Taylor, Bismarck , p. 167
•
9Ibid., p. 168.
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questions, leaving France completely isolated in Europe. Finally, this
situation coul 1 also work to develop relations between Russia and Austria
such as may make it difficult for them both to join in carrying on the
anti-German conspiracy, which in some measure attracted the clerical and
c?ntralizing elements in Europe. Therefore, the policy adopted by the
Iron Chancellor during the early days of the conflict was to set back and
let events take their course.
The initiative for negotiating the Balkan dispute was taken not by
Bismarck but by Count Julius Andrassy of Austria. First getting approval
of the members of the Dreikaiserbund , the Andrassy note was sent to the
powers of Europe for approval in December 30, 1875. The German government
readily agreed to the plan and promised that their ambassadors would be
instructed to support the Austrian plan. 10 It pressed upon the Sultan
a series of reforms, the major ones being equality o^ religion, abolution
of tax farming-, restriction of taxes to the use of the province in which
they were raised, land reforr. and the establishment of a Suropean commission
of revision. Andrassy urged their immediate concession in act; otherwise,
the powers could not continue to assist in the pacification of the disturbed
districts. The note was dispatched to France, Italy and England with a
request for their adherance. The Porte, as usual, was profuse in promises.
However, as the revolt spread to include Serbia and Montenegro the Andr ssy
note fell into disregard.
At this time Bismarck entered into the second phase of his actions
Harris, A Diplomatic History , p. 171.
^Seton Watson, Fmgland and Germany , p. ?16,
5U
during the negotiations. For & time he abandoned passive inaction for
12
a plan of his own. Hmurw feared that Russia had abandonee tne
Drelkuirtrbund and had started planning with the French, Here he could
see the rise of a hostile coalition that could be enlarged to include
Austria. The basis of Eisaiarck'c scare was a report Ire* the German
Ambassador in Paris, von Hohenlohe. Tt stated that the politicians in
Paris were so encouraged by Russian attention that President Thiers ^ ,.
talking of reviving French influence and power through participating In
Hi
a settlement of the Eastern Question under the patronage of the Czar.
Hie fears were encouraged on the thirty first of December when he held a
baffling interview i*ith Goutaut-Brion, French Ambassador in Eerlin.
Bismarck wac asked if it would be possible to separate Alsace and Lorraine
from Germany for a large sum of money. Prince Bismarck answered that
this would be impossible. He said, "the very reasons that caused Germany
to acquire the territory required them to keep it."
In Bismarck's mind, relations with Austria had also become complicated.
A report came that Austria's program was to be made, on Gorchakov's re-
quest, a European program and that Andrassy was ready to yield to Russian
wishes. ' Although Russia and Austria were working through the Dreikaiserbund t
3 2
Harris, A Diplomatic History , p. 171.
13Xbid
., p. 172.
•^Ibid., p. 162.
15
Dugdale, uenaan Documents, p. 27. von Hohenlohe to von Bulow, Berlin,
December 28, 1875, Document No. 195*
l6
Ibid., p. 27.
^Harris, A Diplomatic History , p. 173.
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their cooperation plus their attitude towards France, caused Bismarck
considerable anxiety.
As a result of these developments, Bismarck approached Lord Odo Russell,
English Ambassador at Berlin, and expressed a desire to establish with
London an understanding whereby German support would be p.iven to England's
18
wishes in case of further complications in Turkey, On the first of
February 1876, Bismarck renewed his offer of German support fcr Britain in
the Eastern question. However, the British delayed until the sixteenth
of February before answering. Lord Derby wrote that, "England would not
and could not enter into an exclusive alliance, A concerted action with
Germany cannot be definitely adopted without a clearer knowledge than wo
now possess of the Motives which have lad to Prince Bismarck's rec
19
overtures." 7 Negotiations between Germany and England were then dropped.
By February 19, 1876, the situation looked much better to Bismarck.
In the Spring of 1876, Prince lorchakov of Russia expressed a desire
that a meeting of the Ereikaiserbund should be held. Even though the Treaty
20
of Reichstadt had been signed, he feared a possible Russian-Austrian clash.
The Andrassy note caused much concern in Russian circles because it provided
evidence that Count Andrassy had intentions of taking an active part in the
crisis. Therefore, the Czar proposed that Gorchakov, Bismarck and Andrassy
should take the opoortunity of his own upcoming visit to Berlin and meet
to devise joint measures for the Balkans, In early April, Gorchakov wrote
Monypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . II, p. 892,
^As quoted in: Harris, A Diplomatic History , p, 176,
20Ibid., p. 388.
AnarhSS} lsrltiag him to meet at berlin:
His i¥iajcstj would like very much to meet with him in order to
express hi* satisfaction with the perfect accord which has never
ceased to preside over the itareh of the two cabinets in a crisis
which interests both of them to the s~r:0 degree. His Ma.lesty thinks
that it would be useful to exchange ideas in private conversations
with re *rd to eventualities which mirht have to be envisaged for the
Maintenance of general peace. 21
Andrassy willingly accepted the invitation. He was eager to enlist
22
the aid oi' Uie "great MM in Berlin." Andrassy also notified Sua la
that ht -would arrive i:i Berlin two days early so that an understanding
23
could be reached with Bismarck.
In May lb76, an incident occurred that brought Bismarck into action.
Mohammedan rioters murdered the Jrench and Qer.v.an consuls at Salonica.
Bismarck */illing'JLy agreed to a aset.ing of the Dreikaiserbund after this
incident. On May 11, 13?6, Alexander II and his entourage arrived at Berlin,
and for ten days, the rituals of uniformed and medaled majesty alternated
25
with tha business of the Conference.
In this conference, bismarek opened proceedings by stressing thai, he
was indifferent to the means whereby an understanding was reached. He let
it be known that his great concern was Austrian-Russian cooperation and he
was ready to endorse any arrangement maoe concerning Turkey. Bismarck's
Ibid., p. 288. Prince Gorchakov to Count Andrassy, April h 9 1876.
22
?\s ore-ted in: Suatner, riuesia and the Balkans , p. 161.
Harris, A Diplomatic History P- 289.
2k
Sumner, Russia and the Balkans , p. 162.
23
Harris, A Diplomatic history, p. 29$.
26,
Ibid., p. 168.
attitude was disclosed in a letter written by Count Andrassy to the Emperor
Francis Joseph: "Tho Imperial Chancellor holds fast to tne nee. . of
the alliance of the three powers in the interest of the monarchical princi-
ple. 9t 'many makes no proposal, will acefpt enythj which the two
allies are agreed." 2 ' Germany at this tine was concerns ilj . o-
:ioting Au3tro-Russian unity. When the two powers agreed, Gerr. , I eed;
i** thej did not, Germany could riot cost the deciding vote. 28 jhjj ^s ^e
Ltlon Bisnarok stressed. However, he supported Andrassy on practically
every
;
>oint. A close look at the discussions will ,ive evidence of his
actions
.
Qorohal n .tered the Congress with a prepared program. It had been
prepared by Senoral Ignatyev and stressed these point!
I
1. There were only two ways of solving the problem of the in-
surgents. The first was to constitute them into an autonomous
lity under' Prince Nicholas of Montenegro. The second
was to cede to Montenegro the mountainous part of the province
adjacent to the principality and endow the remainder with
broad immunities ....
2. Montenegro should be recognised as independent an~t receive an
increase of territory either in Herzegovina or on tne coast,
to • with certain areas which had long been the object of
contest between the principality and Turkey.
3. Serbia should be given little Zvornik, which had for many jneam
been a source of friction ostween vassal and suzerain states.
U« 1 'oi'man of December (The armistice as provided by the
Andrassy note) should be progressively extended under the super-
vision of the powers for the benefit of the Christians. 29
Andrassy immediately opposed the major points of this pro P . Bismarck
12, 18767
27Ibid., n. 2?2. Count Andrassy to Emperor Francis Joseph, iterlin, May
28Ibid., p. 77.
29
Ibid., p. 29a,
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sided with Austria to the extent QorchakoT was forced to _n v is pli a*
This is evident in the telegram sent by Andrasay to • eror Francis Joseph.
On May 12, lis said, "Qorchakov roposcd the interrcntion of a
third power which he did nob name, and the entry of the fleet into the
harbor of I'.iek. Botl propositions I resolutely rejected rnd v as supported
by Bismarck." In the evening of the same day Andraaay telegraphed his
Emperor again: "Gorchakov is as soft as butter, has completely given way on
ail the points unsatisfactory for us, How 3 i v ; that the Entente
will COBB Out of this neeting undamaged.M
*
rhua 3orc k .-, vaa forced to abandon Russian plans in the face of
Auatrian opposition backed by Bismarck. Qorchakov'a plans were thrown
away, and for then vaa substituted a document which with the exception of
T$
33
32
a clc:. sntence, was dictated by Andrassj'- himself. Finally, the three
ministers pledged their complete unity in the Eastern Question.
The Berlin Memorandum was drafted which embodied demands for a two
months ar which the belli she Id attempt to rrrivc at an
understanding and further reforms, most of which were already outlined in
the Andrassy note. The memorandum waa telegraphed to the powers Tor
13, 1676, and an inmedii - reply vat urged, bs the "rnerors
r'°^. ** P - ^' ; *
r
*°~ from Count Andrassy to Emperor Francis
Joseph, i'iay 12, 16 76.
Ibid
., p. 2^7. Telegram from Couni, Andrassy to Emperor Francia
Joaeph, ay 12, 1876.
33 Oupdsle, ^erman Documents , p. 2?.
*Sumner, Rnasie and the Ba lkans , p. 163.
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planned to leave Berlin on May 15 • Italy and France acquiesced but
England declined. Lord Derby replied on May 19 , giving several reasons
for England's refusal, three of which are important! England could only
act with the consent of negotiations carried on by the concert; the pro-
visions for a two months armistice might be unjust to Turkey if hostilities
were resumed; and it would be Impossible for the Porte to make the required
economic reconstruction because it would involve too much expense* '
One other incident came out of the Berlin meeting. Prince Gorchakov
of Russia conceived the plan of a great European Congress with Germany.
the disinterested power taking the initiative in calling a Congress con-
37
sisting of the Prime Ministers of the six European powers. ' At this
point Bismarck stressed bis role of disinterest. He refused to take the
lead for a congress fearing that to do so would break up the Three Emperor's
League. In a letter to Bulow, Bismarck gave the reasons for refusing
*
I consider it dangerous to the Kaiserbundniss
»
to peace and to
Germany's relations towards her allies, for a Congress or a Conference
to be held. The danger rests on the fact that Austria's interests
lie much nearer to those of England than of Russia, and that a Congress
will sharply accentuate t is difference, seeing that Austria will be
obliged to choose between the two absolutely opposed interests of
England and Russia...up to the present the Dreikaiserbundniss has been
the security for peace. If it is weakened and relaxed by the deliberate
rapproachement to one another of England-Austria and Russia-France
respectively, the impossibility of reconciling Austria, Russia and
British interests in the East will lead to war. • .Germany would be called
upon day after day to act as umpire between two hostile groups at the
Congress, the most thankless task that could befall us. 38
^Monypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . VI, p. 2k
•
3°T. E. Kebbel, Select Speecnes of the Late Honorable Earl of Beaconsfield .
(London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1552), VII, 160. Speech on the Bulgarian
Atrocities.
3'Dugdale, German Documents , p. 22.
^ Ibid., p. 29. Prince Bismarck to von Bulow, August lU, 1876.
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When Prince Gorchakov ur??;ed that the powers work together because this
was not a German or a Russian but a European question, bismarck replied:
I have always found the word Europe on the lips of those politicians
who wanted something from other povrers which they dared not demand in
their own names , Of course as Christians we ought to have sympathy for
suffering humanity everywhere and especially for suffering Christians
in foreign lands. But thi3 sympathy did not oblige me to risk
Germany's power, 39
Bismarck was unwilling to risk German security at this time. He
pledged complete aloofness, and at the meeting of the three Emperors, re-
fused Gorchakov's motion to send a fleet to Klek. His reasoning is pointed
out by this statement to the Smperor in the Pall of 1676:
As regards the participation by the German fleet in some kind of
a demonstration by sea, I trust that his majesty xS holding firmly to
the intention of refusing to take part in any active naval demonstration
which is not both approved and supported by all the powers. The naval
forces which are now in the waters of the Levant, could make no ef-
fective demonstrations without England, we have no apparent interest-
to justify as in mobilizing our sea forces in other parts. u0
In the Autumn of 1876, after toe Turks suppressed the uprising and
defeated the semi-independent Slav state of Serbia, Pan-Slavism in Russia
could no longer be restrained. The Czar was willing to go to war against
Turkey, but the example of the Crimean tfar made him hesitate, Russia must
not fall again into isolation that had led them to disaster, so before an
aggressive policy could be launched in the Balkans, allies had to be found
that could secure her flanks.
Imperial Germany was approached in two ways. First, Czar Alexander II
asked William I to keep Austria neutral by threats as Russia had done for
•*
°Ibid
. , p. 29, Prince Bismarck to Bulow, August 1U, 1876#
k°Ibid
. , p. 20, Memorandum of Prince Bismarck, October h, 1876,
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Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War. At the same time Oorchakov ap-
proached Bismarok through General von Werder, German military plenipotenti-
ary to Russia, for some expression on the question as to whether or not
Germany would remain neutral if Russia went to war with Austria, This
situation became delicate for Bismarck, Here posed the potential destruction
of the Three Bnpero^s League, He was being asked to support Russian
interests in the Balkansj interests that were directly against those of
England and more important, Austria, To sign a blank check for Russia would
mean the loss of Austria. Besides, England could very well be pushed into
an Anglo-Austrian-French coalition, leaving Germany isolated on the conti-
nent. Here the old problem of the nightmare of coalitions threatened
Bismarck again. He answered through the German Ambassador to Russia,
von Schweinits, with this statement
s
Our first care was to preserve the friendship between the great
monarchies which in a struggle with one another had more to lose as
regarded their opposition to the revolution than they had to win. If
to our sorrow, this was not possible between Austria and Russia then
we could endure indeed that our friends should lose or win battles
against each other, but not that one of the two should be so severely
wounded and injured that its position as an independent great power
taking part in the Councils of Europe would be endangered. . .Germany
would not remain neutral. 1+3
Just as he had done in the Conference of flay 18','6, Bismarck refused to
support Russia. Wita this ambiguous statement, and Bisraarck's refusal to
commit himself, still holding to his aloofness, Russia dropped negotiations
with Germany and began proceedings with Austria. The Reichstadt agreement
hi
Taylor, Bismarck , p. 158.
Sutler, Bismarck , p. 23lw
U3Ibid., p, 231*.
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which tad k nn sirried July 8, 1876, in which Gorchakov and Andrassy agreed
U£on nut they would tolerate in the Balkans, became the only insurance
Eos? la could ?ain against isolation. Bismarck remained content not t«o be
o p.%?ty to t^fq agreement. So long as Russia and Austria were in agreement,
he -.fas contest to rewiiB aloof.
Iftttt ITClpTtilt^ti the oicture at this time was the position tafcon by
BnglarriU Disraeli ftw—
<
to power determined to guide England in an
active foreign policy. Foremost in his plans was the preservation of tie
QttflMB 3/ni;ire, no matter what the cost. The chief concern of Bismarck
was MNMd by the fact that Austria's interests grsvitated closer to England's
th&rx teVNPdl Russia's as far as the Balkans were concerned. If Russia was
successful in the Balkans, and the threat of war became evident, Austria
:*ouid be drawr closer to England. Bismarck's policy towards this situation
is &vidant in this stateiaents
Shi mest unpleasant possibility of all would be a war between
Austria and Russia, especially if Aus^ia were :: waded. This would
produce consequences, which a war between Russia and England would not.
These two powers can-act cbel each other Mortal blows. Tney only hinder
each other's schemes and prevent the carrying out of a particular object,
but not kill each other. So from this standpoint there is no need for
us to prevent such a war. Whereas, since a Russo-Austrian War involves
danger for us, we are forced to do our utmost first and foremost to
stop it by one means or another. U5
With these factors in mind Bismarck entered into the fourth phase of
the negotiations prior to the Congress. He changed his ideas concerning
German participation in t conference and agreed to send a delegate to the
Constantinople Conference, December 23, 1A?6. in regards to trie conference
^Taylor, Bismarck , p. 168.
Dugdale, German Documents , p. 33. von Billow to Count Kunster,
London, November 27, 1876.
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Bismarck wrote to Lord Salisbury of England:
In my opinion it is an error, and probably a deliberate one, to
suppose as apparently it is supposed in various parties, that the
wisdom of statesmen can discover a magic recipe for the inaintenanc* of
peace, where as peace can in fact be assured only if one or more of
the interested powers will make concessions to each other, by lowering
the demand or discording their mutual suspicions... I believe that the
present tensions would have never have happened, if England had come into
line at the time of the Berlin Conference. U6
In regards to Turkey, Prince Bismarck once again let his views be
known. He said to Lord Salisbury: "All Turkey in which I included the
various races inhabiting it, is not so valuable a political institution to
justify the civilized people of Europe in injuring themselves and each other
in a great war for her sake.*1
The object touching German policy most clearly was to get ever the
present crisis without disturbing the existing good relations with their
friends. The primary object was that peace should be maintained between
Russia and Turkey, and the present difiiculties settlew ' - a conference.
Bismarck further suggested to England that should the conference fail not
all would be lost. He recommended that Lord Salisbury follow this plan:
In the event that the Conference failed tne second step lay before
thea; the probability of a Russian advance into Turkey...Even so the
peace of Europe need not necessarily be disturbed...He would warn
England against undue haste if Russia crossed the Balkans.. .England
might well take action without going to war with Russia by entering
into posession of Egypt or probably Constantinople. In this case
Russia would occupy Bulgaria, Austria Bosnia and England Constantinople.
I doubt that the Turk could ever again be set on its hind legs. U6
Bismarck was willing to sacrifice Turkey for the interests of European
** jtbid« a p. 3*4. Memorandum by Prince Bismarck, October 20, I876.
^'Ibid,, p. 3k» Memorandum by Prince Bismarck, October 20, I876.
^ Ibid., p. Ul* von Bulow, to Count Muneter in London, November 27# 1876.
6U
*>eace. Tula is evident ty this statement B^ae la his jwmoira, *Tfeli -r.*v
be only a fantasy oi sy ixa&gination, but if I }*ad a MMMilB| voice
in the situation, i would try to preserve peace between the suropean
powers at the ei-pe.^-e of 'iurkey which eanaot bt preserved intact in
any case**
As feared by Bismarck, the Constantinople Conference faxlad. it
dissolved on January 20, 1677 with the question unsettled. Ski Longer;
Protocol was then circulated among the major powers* It called for rocipro-
50
cal nMnawil of Russian and Turkish forces. This too was declined by
the Porte and Russian forces once again invaded Turkish territory.
'iris did not surprise Msrarck. After a conference with Count Igzatjar
of Russia, who had been sent to Berlin to test Bismarck's attitude, the
Iron. Chancellor told Staperor William, "^ final impression derived from this
long and complicated interview (with General Ignatyev) is tnat tMlla la
spite of her mwintl of preference for a peaceful solution, will strike
51
and will hardly wait fa* tls praptSM draft to be g^neralLy accepted."
Bismarck felt t&Vt he nust mm act in order to prevent a war in which
two of her allies ihpuH be on. different sides. To do this Bismarck desired
a Briti3h-Ru3stan compromise. This could be reached by urging- that England
occupy Sgyot and Russia the Black Sea. In this situation both alffet find it
52
possible to maintain the status quo for a long period.
k97kn quoted Iftj Sontag, Germany and S ^land . p. 1U9
^G3ritisii State Papers . Vol. LXVIII, p.. 6*25» Declaration made by the
Earl 1 WmttlfWW! tkm sifMtart of tbs Protocol.
tfugdsle, goraac Dociaients. o. U2. Prince Bismarck to the Bmperor
William, Kerch h, Tc77.
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Ibid.
, p. U2. Memorandum by Prince Bismarck dictated 8t Kissingen.
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After the failure of the London Protocol and Russia* I invasion of
Turkish territory, a possible English-Russian war loomed larger and larger.
Soon Russian troops entered San Stefano anu t** English fleet was dispatched
closer to the area. One spark could ignite the powder keg that existed.
To make matters worse, when the Treaty of San Stefano was announced,
Andrassy loudly exclaimed, "we have been played false." The danger of
Austria being drawn into the war on the side of England alarmed the Iron
Chancellor*
Leadership in this situation did not come from Bismarck. Again it
came from Andrassy of Austria. In January 1878, Count Andrassy urged that
a conference be held in Vienna composed of the powers who were parties to
53
the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the Protocol of London, 1877. The
purpose of this meeting would be to determine the terms of peace between
Russia and Turkey. The armistice of January 31, 1878 failed to recognize or
make provisions for the agreement of Reichstadt between Austria and Russia,
according to which Austria was to have Bosnia and Herzegovina as a reward
for her neutrality if Russia went to war against Turkey. Andrassy had been
"played false" • For this reason, Austria, acting in the right of one of the
signatory powers to the Treaty of Paris extended the invitations. *
England accepted the invitation on February U, and agreed to Vienna
as the place of meeting. M. Waddington of France answered that he would ad-
here to the proposition under the reservation that the program of the deliber-
53
^British State Papers . Vol. LXH, p. 795. The Earl of Derby to
Count Beust, February 7, 1878.
uugdale, German Documents, p. 6l.
55
^British State Papers . Vol. LXH, p. 79U. The Earl of Derby to
Sir H. Elliot, February U, 1878.
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..13 vo Id be Li id t ' Ue. dj ept
--
I proposals fSSf a confer . f*l*UM was - as the
ne^ti:: J
.,,.-..,
^
for tho con ?s« L; i a - Ion ^*^r a >se tJ Lacs
and the conferoice to bs hold son;time in March, *"
Prince Bismarck accepted in behalf of the Gorman government and later
settled the confusion over where the conference would be held by following
s rk>rchakov si; estion, -rid invited the powers to Bsrliau The proposed
time wr.s March 3, 1870*
5
It was at this tijfci that the Treaty of San Stefr-no «ss anno.inced )sj
ibuosians. Discard: ti M D3tponed the fnnftTUt until tbo Russo-
59
Turkish soaditioaa were g asralJ] publicly Vnovn to -:il parties.
"Snrl lapltsttatl ths sitvailon rarthsr by Btatii I before shs .» ould
agree to a conference all questions dealt with in the treaty of pe^ce between
Russia aid Turkey should be considered as subject to discission in the
conference or con'-.ric$, and thc-t no alteration in the condition of things
previously established bj treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it
60had received loo ssesvt of the powers. To this Prince Gorchakov replied,
"All the great powers know already that the complete t«xt of the preliminary
treaty of peace with the Porte will be communicated to them as soon as the
^6Ibid., p. 796. The Sari of Derby to Sir I* Elliot, March 8, 1 .
^7Ibid., p. 793. The Earl of Derby to Count Beust, March 9, 1876.
-^Dugdale, German Documents , p. 62, Prince jismarck to von Bulow,
J anus r: 3 \ 1' t
•'^Ibid,, p. 63 • Priuce Bismarck to Dulow, February 6, lC.76.
British State Papers . Vol. LXIK, p. 800. Earl of Derby to Count
Beust, March 9, tt'78.
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ratifications shall have been exchanged..we have nothing to conceal,"
Bismarck once again took the initative and proposed that a preliminary
conference be held to settle all misunderstandings. In this way all
preliminary questions would be 8; arranged that the ministers who were to
62
conduct the negotiations would be relieved of them. England refused to
63
take part in planning this conference so it was dropped.
While negotiations were proceeding the situation became more acute.
On February 13 $ British ships under Admiral Hornby sailed into the Sea of
Marmora and anchored off of the Isle des Princes. This situation is
reflected in a statement from Bismarck to von Schweinitz in St. Petersburg!
Lord Odo Russell, himself naturally a peace lover, was convinced
on Saturday that war was imminent and was instructed to ask me what
attitude Germany would adopt towards it. On Monday telegrams arrived
from London and Vienna urging us to arrange for the conference at an
early date, England adding that an early meeting promised the last
remaining chance of staving off war,,,Prince Gorchakov is quite aware
what he is about and does not need our advise; but I beg that you will
communicate the foregoing facts to him, 61*
With the probability of war drawing closer and closer, England and
Russia refused to take part in a Congress until their views were assurred.
The major issue in dispute was that England demanded that all peace conditions
be laid before the Congress and would consider as binding only those articles
6$
to which she herself shall have agreed, Russia at the same time had made
?
Ibid , j p. 801. Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus, March UU> 1378.
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Ibid
., p. 801. Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell, March 15, 1678.
^Ibid., p. 803. Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell, March 16, 1878.
i>ugdale, German Documents , p. 62. Prince Bismarck to von Schweinita
in St. Petersburg, February 20, 1878.
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British State Papers . Vol. LXIX, p. 802. The Earl of Derby to Count
Schuvalov, March 16, 1578.
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assurances to its own nation that it would allow discussion and European
sanction only over points which the Russian Cabinet regarded as departures
from the Treaties of 1856 and 1871.
On February 19, 1678 Bismarck delivered before the Reichstag, a speech
in which he stated his views and position at the proposed congress. Here
he pictured himself as the "Honest 3roker who gets the business done. 1'
Bismarck announced his idea as a basis for the conference and sent telegrams
to all of the powers. His major views were:
1* The conference would meet to examine those articles in the peace
of San Stefano, which affected former European treaties, to wit,
the issce of Paris, 1856, and the London enactment, 1671*
2* The first requirement for the business of the conference is
consequently the communication of those articles by the powers
concerned, Russia and Turkey*
3* The negotiations may attain wider proportion, since the other
powers, on becoming acquainted with the Tra§ty of San Stefano,
may offer objections, protests and counter proposals.
U. The French government's desire that no questions will come
forward for discussion which do not arise immediately out
of the treaty conditions, should be met.
5. As regards a date for the conference, we shall wait until the
other powers are agreed* 67
Even after this plan was drafted England and Russia still refused to
come to terms. Prince Gorchakov declared in distinct terms t^at he would
not allow the articles of the treaty relating to the cession of Bessarabian
Aft
Moldavia to be discussed by the Congress. Lord Salisbury answered this
statement by holding to the proposition that by the declaration annexed to
the first protocol of the conference held in London in 1871, the great powers
°^Dugdale, German Documents , p. 72. Count Miinster to von Bulox?,
March 9, 1878,
°7Ibid., p. 72. Count Muhster to von Bulow, March 9, 1878*
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British State Papers . Vol. LIU, p. 806. Sir H. Elliot to the Earl
of Derby, Vienna, March 23, 1878.
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recognized that no power can liberate itself from the engagement of a
treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent
69
the contracting powers* Lord Beaconsfield backed this statement by
declaring: WI hope it will be clearly understood that we 3nall not attend
the congress if Russia does not agree to lay all the conditions and stipu-
lations before it. Preparations for war would be proceeded with more
70
energy than ever."
Day after day went by with neither side budging. The Russian Cabinet
could not agree to British demands because of fear of the Press and public
71
opinion. England on tne other hand, could not back down because of the
72
ministers bei:;^ so deeply committed to Parliament. It looked as though
war would brf a reality. Lord Derby resigned as Foreign Secretary. Re was
replaced by Lori Salisbury. Disraeli also announced that the Queen had
73
authorized him to call up the reserves. William I of Germany exclaimed,
"so the die is cast." Apparently all plans for the Congress fell through.
Once again Bismarck entered the picture in order to avoid war. Early
in April 1878, he attempted to Justify his claim as the "Honest Broker" by
dispatching the following message to Russia and England:
Our gracious master, the Emperor, guided by the conviction that
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Ibid., p. 807» Marquis of Salisbury to Her Majesties Embassies,
April lT^BYe.
Dugdale, German Documents , p. 73 • Count Munster in London to von
Bulow, March 9, T&THT
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Ibid
., p. 77. Count Munster to von Bulow, March 22, 1678.
Stt*< P* 79# Count Munster to von Bulow, March 27, 1878.
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Ibid
., p. 79. Count Munster to von Bulow, March 27, 1878.
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:.3la nor Bi
n
'
I r^rp.-i ir aa u unavoidable nsosssityj
^j6 rioo deopuix- thao peace can be maintained between tnese two
powerSi both of than frl adly to ( . .
.
:
I ] • ' • irhood of
the British fleet ana the Russian army before Constantinople night
-1
] - ] leti . ,we
agTtfont somewhat in the follovlng iormj Trie British fleet leave
Conatentlnople ind w - aas the >lles»—ths
"
to
retire from uhe Bosphorus to a distance equivalent to the tine re-
Lrad to reinstate tha Brltiah flaat in
"
asent position, 7h
fha 4" t "~> ponars at once accented the nediation of Prince Bismarck Mid
fhc English fleet rni Russian armt»3 vrere moved in accordance with *-he
prop-sal.
Bismarck 'a next concern was to secure the Congress* If the powers
votild agree to ieet, then all controversial %a blona would be ilscuaaed
in concert. Lord Salisbury raplis r, that ha vaa not in fa or o* a
conference being held until agreement of certain points could b^ settled by
Irect negotiations. Tn addition, ha adda bh ' woul ir tc conduct
tha negotiations with the assistance of friendly council from the Imperial
government. To this Bismarck replied: ,,1Te could scarcely refuse this, if
both desire J1". But they mast conduct the actual negotiations ^ne
another. Otherwise there will be confusion ovin^7 to the crossing Of
77
proposals*"
Bismarok notified tossla that he woult! me lata no longer and ii bhey
wanted to negotiate directly throu h Count Schuvalcv, Britain would accept.
This opened the way to the Saliebury-SehuTalov negotiations. In a letter
™Xbid», p. 91, Count Mavis ter to von Bulow, March 28, I878,
Tbid., o. 91. Prince Bismarck to Count Munster, Anril 9, 18?8.
' Tbid. , n. 81. Prince Bismarck to Count Minister, April 9, 187 8.
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Cecil, Life of Salisbury, r. 2':?.
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to the -iueen, Lord Salisbury described the Count's approach
i
Count Schuvalov proceeded to dwell upon the main negotiations and
to express the opinion that the best way of carrying them to a success-
ful issue was that we should state to hira what were the points we in-
sisted most, and that he should go back to St. Petersburg and contact
sinister influences in the Foreign Office, 78
Lord Salisbury then drew up a statement of concessions distinguishing
between those he would fight for and those he would submit to bargaining.
Count Schuvalov also submitted a list and all that was left to effect a
peaceful settlement wss to play a diplomatic game of chess by matching and
79
trading mutual concessions. " The Salisbury-Sehuvalov agreement, signed
June 1, I878, was the green light for Bismarck to issue invitations to the
Congress. Accordingly, they were dispatches to the powers stating that the
Congress would convene July 13, 1878.
It was agreed by the powers that the Congress would be ad referendum
so that every matter could be decided upon at that time. Thus the stage was
set for an international congress. Instead of war being a reality it now
t caws a remote possibility.
f-Ibid., p. 216. Lord Salisbury to ^ueen Victoria, April 29, 1878. By
sinister influences in the Foreign Office, Count Schuvalov was referring to
the influence of Prince Gorchakov and Count Ignatyev, upon Russian foreign
policy.
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Ibid., p. 252.
CHAPaa v
AT THE CONGRESS
The Confess oi Berlin was convened Thursday June 13; 1878. It was
held in Berlin in the Chancellor's former hone, "adzlvill palace. The
setting for the Congress was in the Tain ball roo t« -ere a green taole,
sh?ne i like a horseshoe, had been placed. Tn the midale was the President's
seat; the delegates from ^ance sat on the left, Austria on the ripht.
Tag islegates from England sat nert to tustarlsi those from Italy n*xt to
France* Further deem the Russians s^t on the rlghtj the delegates from
Turkey on the left. A recorder, Radowlta, was placed opposite Bismarck,
It was into this room that the statesmen of the major powers of Europe
would tile Ln order to decide the fate of nations, mil: ions of people, and
the future policy of Europe. It was also hero that one of the three Treat
Congresses of the Nineteenth Century was destined to be held.
The Berlin Congress which sat from June 13 until July 13 is certainly
one of the most memorable in the history of international relations by
reason of the eminence of the men who attended It and the si -nifance of its
p
results. It marks one oi those dramatic pauses in the history of the
world when statesmen meet face to face in the council chamber as the repre-
sentatives of seemingly irreconcilable policies. Yet, this Congress had
Qsorge V T . Chrystal, The Memoirs of Prince Hchenlohe . (New York:
The Macmillian Company, 1906), p. 213.
^Robert Balmain Mowat, The Concert of Eurooe. (London: iMacmiiiian &
Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 63,
Percy Evans Lewin, The Herman Road to the East
.
(New York: Teorge
H. Joran Company, 1917), p. 2b.
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|ority of Ita work already done * -It "net. The secret Sallebury*
Schuvalov Protocol I 30| "u " arlior, 13 le
of thi o foot* Alee tt thia Co is, oi the re«aini tstiona were
to b° oettla l tho iQBttOI and ooaetl net Lnd the ba "v s o' ' iter-
ested parties, while othera were not souss? Ll< ly
wa? frequently iore-ordsin°d to meet ani consider plana that already 1
been settle; by so-^et combinations, ani nothing row lor lisc.vifortnd
parties but to acquiesce with the best ^race oossible. ;israeli pointed
out this altuation boat with the stat^-eiit, ''all questions are publicly
introduced an' then prirately settled."
The Confess of Berlin differed from earlier Er rr ecu concerts by one
mor<= fact. At ^erlv-1 no Sovereigns we^e present. It was the "-inisters who
filled the pubHc's -?aze. Moat statesmen of the *'irst rank foun ) their
to the council and they were so delegate^ with authority that their decisions
coul 1 be binding.
This was a Con ress of "Greater Europe." The live powers, Sermany,
Russia, England, France and Italy took it unon themselves to iecide the
difficulties. Greece, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro and Persia vore not
7
even allowed to ha^e ministers at the eonfe 08 table* The actlwity of
these smaller nations was soent voicing applause for some favorite po-'nt
and approaching the body for the favore :' right to be heard.
^Lewin, The ^erman Road , p. 128.
- quoted in: R.W. Seton ^ratscii, -israeli, fflLadatone the Fa?tern
-^stion
. (Londoi i ~. "ass, 1962), p. Li/iu
"
6Ibid., p. U33.
7
Hanotaux, Cor.t^.. ox-ai^ ^Vance
. p. 3^6.
7U
Bran though time not spent in the Council Chambers was spent in social
engagements such as official receptions, formal balls and supper parties,
there was not the pomp and ceremony attached to the Congress of Berlin as
there had been to other European conferences. Perhaps the most exciting
hour of the whole Congress was when a small yacht, which, owing to a sudden
8
squall, seemed likely to upset and put an end to European diplomacy* No
doubt, much of this was due to the advanced age and ill-health of so many
of the plenipotentiaries*
The terms and provisions that came out of the Congress were given top
priority by the newspapers of Europe* Every major newspaper maintained
reporters at Berlin* The most famous correspondent was M. de Blowitz of the
Paris Times * Prince Bismarck made the members pledge themselves to absolute
9
silence on the deliberations of the Congress* Nevertheless, Blowitz was
able to get first-hand information on the proceeding of the Congress through
a young friend whom Blewits has declined to name* Notes over the day's pro-
ceedings would then be taken by Blowitz* I young friend to a cab owned by
Blowitz* Later, an exchange of hats was used to complete the exchange of
10
information* Blowitz was able to give detailed accounts of the Congress-
ional proceedings soon after they occurred* This led Prince Bismarck, at
one of the meetings to lift the table cloth, solemnly look under the table,
and when asked what he was doing, to have replied, "I am looking for
Chrystal, The Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe * p. 229.
9
B.lowitz, Memoirs of M. de Blowitz . p. 121*.
^Ibid., p. 121*.
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11
Blowitz." With this information, Blowitz was able to publish the final
treaty twelve hours before it was announced in Berlin,
Before agreeing to hold a Congress, Bismarck had asked each power to
12
send representatives ad referendum . As a result, the top statesmen of
Europe gathered at Berlin,
Count Andrassy, Baron de Haymerle and Count Karyoli represented Austria-
Hungary, Of the three Count Andrassy was the major spokesman. Tall, with
a massive head and upturned moustache, he was the ideal of a great Magyar
13
magnate. On formal occasions he appeared in a magnificent scarlet cloak.
However, he was more than just a nice-appearing Hungarian, he was experienced
in the field of international politics and knew the political life of London
11*
and Paris, Armed with the Reichstadt agreement he went into the Congress
for a clear-cut purpose—setting aside the Treaty of San Stefano,
M, Waddington was the chief French delegate. He had been educated in
England and held the distinction of being the only member of the Congress to
ever be on a rowing team. He was a classical scholar and later wrote a book
on Greek Archaeology, He impressed all who met him by honesty and good
sense. However, he had been described as being "quite ignorant of foreign
affairs and likely to take unexpected steps," The major concern facing
"^ewin. The German Road , p. 129,
12
By this Bismarck asked for ministers of cabinet rank empowered with
the authority to make what ever decisions necessary,
13
Lewin, The German Road , p. 131
•
%bld
.. p. 131.
^Ibid., p. 131.
As quoted in: Seton Watson, The Eastern Question, p, hhh»
Waddington '.fas that the African question must not be raised at the Congress.
France with interests in Morocco and eyeing Tunis did not want Africa parcelled
by an international congress. Two other French delegates were sent to the
Congress, M. de St. Vallier and Desprez. However, both played subordinate
roles to Waddington.
Count Corti was the Italian representative. He may best be described
as a professional diplomat, and belonged to the best type of European perma-
17
nent official. His colleague was Count Launay, a man of more social
ambitions than ability. Corti was forced to play a negative role in the
Congress due to Italy's recent admission as a great power and her fluid
Balkan policy. l8
Turkey was represented by Sadullah pasha, Mehmed Ali pasha and
Caratheodory Pasha. Of the three the last played the significant role.
He was a man of high culture and intelligence but lacked authority and back-
bone. Lord Salisbury best described him by stating, "he was a poor, weak,
19frightened creature, and when not frightened, not wholly trustworthy. 9
Bismarck regarded the Turks with scorn. Turkey, whose existence and whose
20territories were in question, should be treated as vanquished. The Turks,
feeling themselves left out of major issues, protected, but as soon as they
21
did the wrath of the Imperial Chancellor soon descended upon them.
^-7Mowat, Concert of Europe , p. 66.
•"teeton Watson, The Eastern Question, p. khh*
9k8 quoted in: Seton Watson, The Eastern Question , p. Uhk*
20Hanotaux, Contemporary France , p. 3U8.
21Seton Watson, The Eastern Question, p. 1*1*5.
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Russia was represented by Count Schuvalov and Prince Gorchakov. Between
the two considerable rivalry existed. Schuvalov was climbing to challenge
the master of Russia's foreign policy and vain Gorchakov resented it. How-
ever, at the Congress it was Gorchakov who gained most of the headline»
and took part in the most controversial questions. However, many felt that
22
the real holder of Russian plenary powers was Count Schuvalov. The
Congress of Berlin posed a last opportunity for Gorchakov to end his
diplomatic career in a blaze of glory. This is pointed out by a statement
he made prior to the Congress, he "did not wish to take leave of public
life like a snuffed-out candle, but like the sun whose last rays shed
23dazzling radiance over the landscape. M J
The Congress of Berlin had provided him with that chance. However,
2U
Gorchakov was now eighty years old, ill and tottering. Lord Salisbury
drew the following opinion of him: "Prince Gorchakov was a little, insig-
nificant old man—full of compliments—but otherwise having lost his head. 11 m
Again he makes his views known by saying, "there is no doubt the presence
of Gorchakov materially complicates matters and that if some kindly fit of
26
gout would take him off we would move much faster." However brilliant
he might have been at one time in his life, this was not reflected at the
Congress. He was present at the settings of the Congress only at long intervals,
"Butler, Bis.-crck . p. 336.
-*As quoted in: Andrassy, Bismarck j Andrasgy and their Successors , p. 17<
2
**Mowat, Concert of Europe , p. 62.
2
^As quoted in: Cecil, Life of Salisbury, p. 279.
'
"
^Ibid . , p. 281. Letter from Lord Salisbury to Mr. Gross, June 15, 1878.
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usually announcing that some indisposition kept l^im to his rooms. He still
maintained his elecuoence at speaking but he tended to constantly generalize.
Schuvalcv stressed that, "he was incapable of pointing out on c map, even
approximately, the different countries of the Ealkan peninsula." fc ' Despite
his failures, Gorchakov cane to the Congress armea with a desire to pose as
a saviour for Russia and possibly ;
:
ain more from the Congress tnan he could
28
from Er-gland alone. He felt that possibly, some mutual suspicion night
keep Austria snd England apart, and enable the Russians to isolate one of the
29
two and drive a hard bargain with the other. '
Disraeli, Lord Salisbury and Lord Odo Russell represented England at
the Congress. The most important role was played by Benjamin Disraeli,
the Sari of Beaconsfield. He posed just as striking a figure as Bismarck
of Germany and Gorchakov of Russia. He came to the Congress with the
prestige of the statesman who had determined the basis on which the Congress
would assemble. He had made it clear that rather than accept Russia«
30
Eastern settlement, England was in last resort, prepared to fight.
Disraeli, like Gorchakov, was not in the best of health. He was in his
seventies, walked with a cane and was ard of hearing. During the Cor.gress
he was hampered with gout and a severe cough. Likewise, he was handicapped
by an inability to use French.
At first Bismarck was suspicious of Disraeli but after dealing with
him made this statement, "Per Alte Judex das ist der Mann ." (That old Jew,
anotaux, Contemporary France
. p. 35>2.
2
"Seton Watson, The Eastern Quettlon» p. U*l.
29Kfedlicott, The Congress of Berlin , p. 6.
3°Konypenny and Buckles, Disraeli
.
IV. 312.
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31
that is the Man.) The meaning implied by Bismarck is that Disraeli gets
things done, Bismarck developed a growing respect for Disraeli's wit, his
energy, his defiance of physical disabilities, and he knew that power lay
32
in his hands. About Disraeli bismarck saidx
He spent several evenings with us. Since he waB not welD he would
come when there were no other guests. Thus X became intimate with him.
Although he had written such ianciiul novels, he was a man with whom
it was easy to do business, wit.iin one-, quarter of an hour one knew
exactly what he would be at* 33
Disraeli's crucial dealings in the Congress centered around Gorchakov.
They developed a rivalry similiar to chess partners. It was devoted, sedate,
and good-humoured, each straining resolutely for his own hand but always
3k
with perfect loyalty to the rules of the game. " After sessions of the
Congress were over, it was a common sight to see Disraeli, tall and grace-
ful, but himself a little shaky with his seventy years and bad couph, giving
his arm to the still more aged Gorchakov down the steps of the German
15foreign Office. ' Most of the work at the Congress was done by Salisbury.
Disraeli attempted to save himself for the more important decisions at hand.
Bismarck, Prince Hohenlohe and Prince von Bulow represented Germany.
Needless to say, Prince Bismarck was the major German spokesman. Tn reality
it was not "Per Alte Judew (Beaconsfield) but "Per Alte Junker" (Bismarck)
36
that was the guiding figure at the Congress.
* As quoted ins Monypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . TV, p. 311»
°2
* Seton Watson, The Eastern Question , p. 1*39.
3*
As quoted in: Ludwig, Bismarck , p. '519.
3k
.ford and Gooch, British Foreign Policy , p. 139.
3-tyowat, Concert of Europe , p. 6£.
36
Robertson, Bismarck, p. 3^0.
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The Berlin Congress gtressed well the growth and influence of the Gerren
government. In the Peace Conference of 1856, Prussia had kindly beer given
the vacant chair. The diplomatic salute which had be*n taken by Napoleon III
in 1856 was now taken by Bismarck. Germany^ position had changed in
3Y
Europe,
The Congress was a ahow piece for Bismarck* s personality. Eis vast
reputation and achievements would have made him, in an.y circumstances, the
outstanding personality, but the position of President gave him additional
38
prestige which he exploited to the fullest. ' He gave the great statesmen
of Europe a taste of the rough jovial manner with which he entertained German
politicians at his beer evenings. He even appeared at the early sessions
in a beard, and shaved it off only for the potrait which concluded the
Congress. Protocol was ignored; everything wa~ subordinated to punctual
3?
and enormous meals.
Bismarck's health was not at its best. He was ill and could only join
the meetings by a strong effort of will. On the subject of his health at
the Congress, Bismarck said:
I rarely got to sleep befora six in the morning; often not until
eight, and then only for an hour or two. I would not r2ceive anyone
before noon. Icu can imagine what state of mind I was in by the time
ths settings opened. Before each setting I drank three or foor glasses
of strong port wine, in order to set my v lood coursing, for otherwise
I should heve been fit for nothing. kO
As a result, he was often hurried anc exacting of the delegates of the
37
Ibii *, p. 3U0.
3^
ilicott, The Congrees oi ?erH n» p. 35*
-^Taylor, Bi marck . p. 177.
As quoted in: Luc'/.-; -, ggargk* p. 519
•
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Congress. At private sessions he co-Id be seen striding up and down
exclaiming, "Gentleman, nettle, settle, I insist—or tomorrow T go to
fell
1*3
Kisoiry-en." The excuse for his impatience at the Congress was that he
wanted to oscape the Berlin heat and tc start a cure at Kiesingen,
Yet, at the meals it was common to sec him stuffing shriaipe into his rr.outh
hu
with one hand and sherries with the other.
There was another reason for this haste. The Congress met WMter the
shadow of the assassination attempt of Hodel and Nobiling, The J&nperor
William was still too ill from the wounds inflicted upon him to entertain
the delegates. This task fell on °rince Bismarck. Fearing an atteript on
his lifo, he made himself almost a prisoner in hie own home at a moment
when the diplomatic world was at his call. He left most of the entertaining
to subordinates , It is said he always had two revolvers on his writing
table, and carried a revolver even when he walked in the garden. He
was anxious to leave the charged atmosphere of Berlin for the quiet sur-
roundings of Kissin^en,
The Iron Chancellor became the master of the Congress and ruled it with
an iron hand. He could make the statement si^-iliar to Louis XIV of Frarce,
Hanotaux, Content:orsry Frarce , p, 3^7*
1*2
As quoted in: Robertson, Bisn^>rck , p, 3l»7.
Ibid., p. 3U7.
kk
Taylor, i iisr.arck
. p. 177.
ilicott, The Oct -
t ress of nerlln . p, 37. Hodel and Nobiling un-
successfully attempted to assassinate the Bnperor Villjja. However,
Nobility seriously wounded him.
U6
Ibid,, p. 37.
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Le Conrrea, c'cst mol , (The Congresa, it is T) The atatetren of the
con^reas were aware of this as can bo -.stb^red taj these statements. First,
Count Schuvalov of Russia said: "Pr^ce Bismarck praal4t4 over the
Congress with a certain military I r Mm oi manner which did not
please those present and which the representatives of all the powers took
in good cart."
Lord Salisbury expressed the same viewpoint in a lettsr to Lady
Salisbury, June 23* 1678: "Bitnarck is decidedly losing his temper* He
never loses an opportunity of iiiforndng us that he does not care two straws
for the Turkish question and objects' to considering any question which is
net a question of peace and war,"
Lord Beaconsfield also describes the President of the Congress:
"tfismarck soars overall. He is six feet, four inches, proportionately stout,
with a sweet and gentle voice, and with a perculiarly refined enunciation
SO
which singularly and strangely contrasts with the avful things he s£.ys, N
Prince Gorchakov, wore than anyone, voiced displeasure with B&HMOFVk1!
handling of the Congress, To one who had attended the Conference of 11356"
as Oorchakov had done, Bismarck's actions were disgraceful, Bt said, "Prince
Bismarck is a very bad President, Aw he had no experience of Congresses, and
^'As quoted in: Hsnotaux, Contemporary France , p, 366. Louis XIV of
France made this statement, Lai t, e'est v.oi , meaning, The State, it is I*
US
As quoted in: Hanotaux, Ccnte-romr;- Fra.> ce , p. 3<-»7.
u>Cecil, Life of Salisbury , p, 287. Lord Salisbury to Lady Salisbury,
June 2k, 1078.
50
nonypenny f>"<? RucVes, 1 ?rsfiV2 » IV, p, 329, Lord ^eaconofieid
to Lady 'Bradford, Berlin, June 26, lei 78.
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conducts business as if it vera a Parliament. 1
The Turkish delegates were not treated kindly by Bismarck. This ia
evident when Caratheoaory Pasha declare i Ion ; after the Congress was over:
"The Confess of Berlin was completely dominated by Prince Bismarck.
Circumstance gave the Prince a position as unparalled in Germany as in
52
Europe... The confidence and fear he inspired were general."
On the other hand, the President developed opinions of the delegates,
some of them unfavorable. His contempt tor Gorchakov was clearly evident
throughout the Congress. Not once did he show the Russian Chancellor any
courtesy, fit one time he even insulted him by letting a Turkish delegate
53
speak In priority to Gorchakov. What dealings the Chancellor had with
Russia were done through Schuvalov.
It has already been mentioned that Bismarck regarded Disraeli favorably.
The other English delegates did not enjoy this distinction. About Lord Odo
Russell he said, "T detect a hidden flaw in Russell for no Englishman can
be so perfect as he seems, and he is a man who speaks all languages incredibly
well. -^ Lord Salisbury was not regarded too highly by Bismarck. He 3aid,
"I would like to have him in the hands of a German drill sergeant for half
tfij
an hour a day, to teach hi-n to hold himself better." -^ About Count Corti
if Italy, Bismarck drew a favorable opinion. He said, "that is a very
^ Ibid
., p. 328. Lord Beaconstiela to Queen Victoria, London, June 23,
1878.
' As quoted in: Hanotaux, Contemporary ^ance
. p. 3U7»
Lewin, The German Road , p. 1U1.
As quoted in: Ludwig, Bismarck , p. 519.
''As quoted in: Ludwi ;, Bismarck. ... 5>1^«
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sensible little man; he must be treated well." -*
Of all the delegates attending the Congress, Bismarck rated the Turks
the lowest. He regarded them with scorn and distrust. In his first conver-
sation with them on June lli, he said bluntly:
They were greatly mistaken if they imagined that the Congress had
met in Turkey* s interest. Do not imagine that anything but disaster
could cane to the Sultan from the break up of the Congress, The Treaty
of San Stefano had left him an independant sovereign, and its terms
ight even be modified at Berlin, but if the Congress failed, war would
follow. 57
Nevertheless, Bismarck understood how to disregard everything su-
perfluous, disturbing, or time wasting. All members of the Congress agreed
that the comparatively speedy procedure and finish were due to the supreme
58
authority and personality of Prince Bismarck, Although ill and restless,
the Iron Chancellor exerted enormous energy in guiding the Congress,
Prince Bismarck also had his motives. They were to use the Congress
to prevent an outbreak of war. He stated: "I am not interested in the fate
of 'the people down there. 1 We are not here to consider the happiness of
59
Bulgarians but. to secure the peace of Europe,"
60
Bismarck was extremely cautious. He was so determined to emphasize
his countries impartiality that he is said to have prefixed almost every
statement at the Congress with the words, "L f Allemagne, qui n 1 est lice par
As quoted in: Chrystal, The Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe , p, 208.
57
As quoted in: Kedlicott, The Congress of Berlin , p. ii7«
58
Geoffrey Dunlap, Memoirs of Prince von Bulow. (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1932), p. U50.
59
A
^4edlicott, The Congress of Berlin , p. 37.
s quoted in: Chrystal, "he Me.-.oirs of Prince Hohenlohe. p. 2XU«
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aucun interet direct dans les affairs d 1 Orient ." (Germany had no direct
interests in the affairs of the East,) It was essential for Bismarck that
the Congress did not break down under his presidency. At the opening the
British and Russians were still far apart, and Disraelis attitude highly
alarmed him. When he was asked if the chance for peace was good, he
worriedly answered, "the odds in favor of peace are 66-3U or perhaps 70-
62
30." He arranged for private negotiations and also that the Germans
63
should avoid being deeply committed on the crucial difficulties. He
left them to the British, Russians and Austrian*, himself only intervening
to prevent a deadlock.
As mentioned earlier, Bismarck posed as the defender of Russia. Re
would side with her on details and on points that had little bearing on the
Congress knowing that she would be outnumbered by Austria and England. He
was also determined that Germany was not involved in any decision for which
she could be blamed. An example of this is provided in the meeting of June
22. Here, the Congress discussed the boundaries of East Roumelia. Britain
proposed that it should be placed under the direct political and military
authority of the Sultan. He should have the right to fortify and maintain
troops along these boundaries. The Russians immediately put forward reser-
vations. Andrassy sided with the British and a condition for a dispute
arose. Bismarck studiously conciliatory towards Russia, proposed that
Waddington of France be selected to find a formula which could meet Russian
61
As quoted in: Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin , p. 37.
°2As quoted in: Ludwig, Bismarck , p. 520.
Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin , p. 38.
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objections. After two days work he presented a plan to the Confess that
was voted on and accepted. Thus Bismarck had carefully avoided a decision
or discussion that could have involve! Qcrmany* *
The 4 irst Meeting of the Congretf took place at two o'clock Thursday
June 13, 1?78. As the members entered Radaiwill Palace they were escorted
6£
to a buffet where they drank port and ate buscuits. Shortly after, a
move was made into the grand ball room where the settings wero to be held.
Prince Bismarck then made the opening speech ot the Congress: "The object
for which the Congress was assembled, was to submit the work of San Stofono
to the free discussion of the governments which signed the Treaties of 18£6
and 1871."
66
Count Andrassy then rose and proposed the election ot Prince Bismarck
as President. He then made proposals as regards the Secretary and Recorder.
67
All were accepted. Prince von Hohenlohe then introduced the personnel,
Bismarck then proceeded with the business at hand. As a :reed upon in
an earlier meeting, the most important questions facing the Congress were
68
discussed first. Bisnsrck feared that it the Treaty ot San Stetano was
discussed article by article much time woul i be wasted ana nothing ac-
ro-rplished. Therefore, the first item ot business was Bulgaria. It was
6IiLudwig, Bismarck, p. £2U.
:-!onypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . IV, p. 313.
As quoted in: Monypenny and Buckles, jjsraeli . IV, p. 313.
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felt that if this could be settled, the remaining points would fall into
place.
The article creating a G^eate- "is, 'r L&S VT o* b v . aty of
69
San Stefano, was placed before tho rrouo, but no diteuttiOfl wtl undertaken.
A four day recess was called so that each ration could for I lti own
Bulgarian policy. Then, after ceaconsfiel
.
: stressed the withdrawal ot the
Russian army from the area abound Constantinople, and Schtnralor't immediate
70
refusal, the Congress adjourned to a state banquet ft 6tU5«
The second meeting was called Monday June 17, The sixth article of
71
the Treaty of San Stefano was then read. To it, the English offarad two
resolutions: (1) That the chain of the Balkans should be the new frontier
of Turkey, (2) That in the country South ot the Balkans, the Sultan should
72
exercise a real political and military povr . Russia immediately refused
both propositions. They favored a longitudinal line rather than the Balkan
line, and that the Turkish troops should not be permitted to enter +
73
province which the Russians called South Bulgaria, After this opening
debate, the Prince adjourned the Congress until Wednesday,
What happened during this recess was a typical method by which business
7U
was conducted. If a serious problem would present itself, Bismarck would
^Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin , p, U5«
'°Chrystal, The Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe
. p, 21lu
' British State Papers
, p, 866, Protocol 'lumber 2, June 17, 1878.
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Tbid
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call a recess, bundlo the iatertsted rr.rties into private chambers, where
they would solve the problem.
On June 18, a conference was held between Count Schuvalov and Baron
d* Oubril, Count Andrassy and Baron de Haymerle and Lords Salisbury and
Beaconsfield, the purpose being to discuss the Bulgarian situation. Here,
Schuvalov announced that he accepted the Balkan line, but the second reso-
76
lution was so serious that he must refer to the Qnperor. On June 19,
the Congress met again but took no action as Schuvalov was still waiting
for the Slnperor. On the twentieth, another meeting took place between the
ministers of Austria, England and Russia. Beaconsfield stated at this
77
conference that if his views were not met he would leave the Congress.
This was the crucial moment of the Conrress. If Russia did not r;ive
in, Beaconsfield threatened to return to England where a declaration of
war would soon follow. Beaconsfield was not bluffing. In fact, he had
even rone so far as to order his secretary, Lord Rowton to telegraph for a
78
special train to take them from Berlin if the Russians did not surrender.
Many observers felt that war was certain.
On Friday June 21, Beaconsfield was invited to dine with Bismarck.
After their meal Bismarck asked T eaconsfield 1 s intentions in regard to the
Bulgarian situation. Here Bismarck was told that the ultimatium to Russia
'^•onypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . IV, p. 322.
^Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin * p. £1*.
11
Monypenny and Buckles, Disraeli . TV, p. 323.
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A. N. Cumming, "The Secret History of the Treaty of Berlin—A Talk
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Leonard Scott Publication Co., July-December, 1S"0$), 91*
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wn not • chant. Biswarck than lost r.o time iaprassirg upon the Russian
deler*t«s tho nsed for o ti*ely retreat* On tho rtnrninf of Juno 22,
Ruasie surrendered to Shglleh demand* , 'Vines Oorehakov, who ted reeialrod
aloof fron tho negotiations over Pu\"st*b statedt "We hove sacrificed 100,000
81
picked scldiers and 100 million* of Rene? for en illanesje* Bismarck
said to Beeconefield r "Ynu havo rer ~3oent to tho Suiter of U,000 equoro
8J>
miles of the rleheet soil* There 1s arein e Turkey U Europe.
This agreement then become pert of tho provisions of tho Treaty of
3erllru Tt provided thot Bulgaria snoulo bo cut lr two, exclusive of
Macedonia, wMch was disregarded in the rw arranfereert* The northern,
end larger, portion was to be an autonomous principality, tri i-.*r to
•'.coy, bounded by tho Dam- , a lack Mi (with en outlet »t 7ama),
the Balkans, and the frontiers of Serbia, its ruler to bo freely elected
the population seal confirmed by the ^orto, with the consent of the powers*
Hi of the "alkans, the province of Pastern Rcu*elis was to be formed,
with adMMrtrative autonomy but subject to tho political arvi military
83
authority of tho rultan.
To this Caratheoday Paeha r protested but was soon reduced to
silence by Bismarck who warned that after signing tho Treaty of It! -tofano,
79
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Turkey had no right to raise objections.
90
8U
Corchakov up until this time had net been ?ttendV sessions because
of his ill health. However, when the ifli'te—nt was announced publically,
he appeared before the body as thifl statement:
During the last M isleo fr ich T hav: abse t, ny
colleagues had conceded in Russia's name, more than was intended they
should, ••I understand the loyal feelings of ray GdllMglM too well to
raise any objection to the concessions they had felt it their duty to
make, ••Russia wished to show the world, that she willingly exchanged
laurels of victory gained at the cost of so much precious blood for
the palm of peace, 86
Here was a good example of Bismarck using his influence to prevent
the war he so desperately feared. Convinced that Beaconsfd eld's ultimatun
was real and aware of the Czar's unwillingness for war, he advised the
Russian delegates of the necessity for compromise.
After the Bulgarian question seemed safely out of the way, Bismarck
felt that the tempo of the Congress should be quickened. He presented a
definite program for its future work, and decreed all detailed discussions
87
of frontiers should be referred to a boundary committee.
The noxt important incident in the Congress took place June 28, The
English Plenipotentiary, Lord Salisbury proposed, "that the powers should
entrust Austria-Hungary with a mandate for the occupation of Bosnia-
88
Herzegovina," Thus proceedings were undertaken for the finest conquest of
PI
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the whole campaign. Austria-Hungary, with no outlay of gold or life had
89
gained a country 3* reat strategic inieortence on the highway to Salonika.
Andrassy' s desire in the Congress was to o-Mn these two states. The
method he used to acquis. than is inter- stin T . He stated:
Tt was useful for our prestige that our occupation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina shoul J not be an ordinary act of conquest or of an agree-
ment with Russia, but the result 01 a mandate originating in the
confidence and consensus cf opinion of Europe, entrusted to us in the
interests of civilisation end humanity. 90
In order to secure this Andrassy had to get someone to recommend that
91
the mandate be established. 3i snare'' offered to but Andrassy refused.
He feared that public opinion at home hould accuse him of undue subservience
to the victor of Koniggretz. The offer must come from London. When
approached, the English readily agreed to endorse this as a proposal in the
Congress. As a result Lord Salisbury made the proposal June 28. In the
session Andrassy opened proceedings by stating:
Austria-Hungary has had to receive more than 15>,000 Bosnian
fugitives, who obstinately refused to return home as long as their
country was under Turkish rule, since the Turks neither gave tl
protection nor any means of making a livelihood... I do not demand that
3osnia shoul i be annexed by Austria-nungary. T only urge the CongTOM
to make some decision. 93
To this Lord Salisbury made the mandate proposal. To this he further
stated: "the Porte would give evidence cf the greatest wis ion in refusing
89
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longer to undertake a task that is beyond her strength; and in entrusting
it to a power able to fulfill it, she would avert all the formidable darters
from the iimpire• ,,
Bismarck supported the proposal and proclaimed:
It is not only an Austria- interest, but a pereral duty
•••Germany, who is connected by no direct interests with the d
ox Mm !••%! is of opinion that only a powerful state, r-H.t;- • at
her disposal for crushing all disorder, car therefore establish harmony
and assure the welfare of the people, 9!i>
Russia did not protest the decision. By the Reichstadt apreeruert of
1876, this was in accord witn Austro-kussian policy. The Turkish delegate
piade a shy protest but he was quieted by Lord ^eaconsfield who said that
tc protest is a lack of wisuom ana of repara for the true interests which
96
:ed the policy oi the Turkish government.
In article twenty-five, this mandate was incorporated Into the Treaty
of 'erlin, Tt provided for Austria to occupy and administer Bosnia and
Herzegovina, subject to Turkish suzerainty. The Sardjak of ^ovi-Bazar
should not be divided between Serbia end *onteneero but be garrisoned by
Austria, in accordance with her wish, without prejudice to Turkish
97
sovereignty, * '
After this second major apreemont the Conrress moved into the Greek
98 99
question. In the session of June 29> it was settled. The Greeks
1678.
9k
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based their pretensions on the theory that the business which the powers
had undertaken was to partition one Turkish Empire. Therefore, because of
Greek neutrality during the past three years, they had a legitimate and
sizeable claim. ?rance and Italy moved that a frontier rectification take
100
place on behalf ot "reece. ' However, no other encouragement was given to
these suggestions; and Greece hai to settle for a promised extension ot her
frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus. She was also informed that " Stares, like
individuals, which have a future are in a position to be able to wait,. 11 01
During the early days of July the Serbian, Montenegrin and Roumanian
questions were settled. .All three principalities were declared independent
of the Porte in accordance with the Treat:/ ot 3an Stefano. In the three
newly independent states equality Of all religions was enjoined by
French demand* This was supported by Prince Bismarck. He pointed to
the German Constitution and declared that German public opinion demar
that the principle of equality for all religion! feitha which prevailed
in German}' honld be applied also to Qsraany*f I I policy. lis
settleme.it, the newly independent states were also awarded territory. Serbia
102
was given '"is, Montenegro, Podgoritsa and Antivair.
The main discussion over the analler powers centered around Roumania.
She had fought on the side of the Russians .iurin; che war but for the size
of reward received* she eight a3 well have resisted the Russians. Rooeanle
was forced bo ;ive up Bessarabia tc Russia in return tor an area known as
100
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?t of Land ttm Bilistil to vangclia, on the Black Sea, and
103
the Snake Isle.
The tU in delegates, M. M. Brantlano and Kogalniceano, were not
allowed tr w la the work of the Cc-ngrtM. They were merely heard by
the representatives of the powers. They presented a memoir, but it :7as
known ir advance that this "was sheer waste of energy and that the position
101*
of the powers had already been taken,
r 1 1 srnarck vigorously supported the Russian demand for Bessarabia.
He even insisted that negotiations upon this point be accelerated. He hoped
the Danube Principalities would be content with the recognition of their
independence.
105
The next and final crisis in the Congress came over the port city of
106
Batum and the frontier line of Asiatic Turkey. By the Treaty of San
"tefano, Turkey had given to Russia the territories of Ardaham, Kars and
107
Batum. By the Salisbury-Schuvalov orreement the territory of Bayazid
and the Valley of Alaskherd were restored to Turkey. Thus, the important
commercial route to India by the sources of the Euphrates remained in
108
Turkish hands. In return, Enrland agreed "not to contest the desire of
109
the »peror of Russia to occupy the port of Batum."
103Ibid., p. I4I48.
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At tin Con :s, " ! hoped to iacuro some limitations on Russian
occupation ol' 3a turn and fmrorable froi Lsr line that would rksy
with a line of defense afalnst Russia. C. - indsd the 3alis-
bury-Schuv : ree-nent, and was determined ".o n <:-. ^«de. How-
ever, the matter was tak<3" oat Df his hi Prln< Qorchakow announced
that he would 3ettle the natter -' ct. sonsflsld.
Lord Beacons! ieli and Prlnoa Oorchakov rlOO« ! ras
held J.li % the Other on July ninth. Here it VM vd
111
be a free B.ad commercial port. >ver, • Misunderstanding c?curreo in
the Congress over the proposed Asiatic frontier*
The Russian General Staff had par I a nap of the llsputed area.
One showed the frontiers most desired by Russia, the other ess tho one they
would settle for only as a emtt lest resort. Ihla nap was takes by
Gorchakov to i neetlng with Beaeonsflsld« The next at a no< '. ol the
Congress Prlnoa Bismarck ordered Bsaeonsfleld and Oorchakov to Vie by
side at the table with the various naps > Ma* hov's map con-
tained only the line of 3an Stefano while Bsaconsflsld'a map contains
least desirable line the Russian;* had declared. Oorchakov exclai^e^, "it
is treason j they have the nap of cur Staff*" This was the sad of ths dis-
lon. The matter vras left to a ooaaalttee Of Schuvalov, Salisbury and
112
Kohenlche. The issue "was finally settled on July 10. Prince Hoh-snlohe
110CecU, of Salisbury . -. 293. T,or J Salisbury td r. Jross,
July ID, lc'VS.
ilonypeuny and Buckles, Jiarueli
. IV| p. 336. Lord 3eaccnafield
to Queen Victoria, July 6, 1878.
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reported: "After a Ion? search we found a small niece which we could take
away from the Russians} some mountain ridges out of which the line of
113
conciliation was accopted. H
This ended the major decisions that had to be roached and the major
work of the Congress, According to Bismarck's plan, when all of the great
questions vrere settled, and a treaty executed to that effort, the little
questions could be decided by local commissions consisting of the l-esident
114
ambassadors and some experts.
As the Congress neared its end news of the unglo-Turkish agreement
in which Britain was ceded Cyprus, appeared before the Congress. Lord
Salisbury had before-hand notified the interested powers and Bismarck 1 s
work increased frantically to see that business was done so that he could
115
leave for Kissingen.
116
On July 13, the treaty was ready for the signature of the delegates.
The ceremonies began at two o' clock although the treaty was not signed until
four. The members of the Congress, attacke's and secretaries, all In uni-
form, spent the time exchanging signed photographs and discus ting the
II?
oourse of the last months' events.
The sitting began with a speech by Bismarck and was broker up when
Andrassy expressed the thanks of the meeting to the President. The
113
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signing then took place and a concluding speech was given by Bismarck.
I pay tribute to the spirit of conciliation and mutual f oodvill
which has animated all the Dlenipotentiaries. The Congress has
deserved well of Europe, T f it has bMB imoossible to fulfill all
the aspirations oi public opinion, history will, at all events, do
justice to cur intentions and to our work, 113
That night a great state dinner was held. Here the Crown Prince
Frederick III made a farewell speech
,,,The work of peace so earnestly desired bv Europe is the crown
of your efforts, I am happy to do honour to the wisdom and the spirit
of reconciliation which had brought about this happy rem:? t. The
agreements which have been accomplished will be a new pledge for peace
and general well-being, 119
The next morning the Plenipotentiates left Berlin for their respective
countries, Bismarck quietly left for Kissinger., Lord T;eaconsfield and
Lord Salisbury left for England where they could announce their "Peace
with Honour," The Turks dejectedly went back to their homelan Li
the Italians. Prince Gorchakov, in weak health, left for Russia where
he was warmly received by Czar Alexander II at Tsarshoe Selo. The Trench
delegate left for France with some thought of her colonial future and
120
Andrassy departed feeling as one of the victors of the Congress,
The Treaty of Berlin must be claimed as a victor' for Anglo-Austrian
policy and a severe loss for Russia, Russia entered the Congress a victo-
rious nation. She expected the gains of conquest which would bring her close
to hor centuries-old dream of an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, Her
ij sappointment was natural. Prince Gorc^akov, in a letter to M de .liers,
lift
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expressed tats disappointment:
Tho Treaty of Peace will be signed tomorrow. I do not envy hvn
(Sc " . >f that I .licetion, end I only
regret having had to put my signature on such a transaction. T doubt
more vltalit I that tall. -oover, rrery*
thi i be on is ca the policy that the Baperor will adopt for the future^
and if, as in 185>6, we return tc this system of recueillemer. t. ?"br
my part, I adroit that I did not expect this pa^e at the conclusion of
physical and political life* which at best, cannot be very far away.
All that I ask, is that I hi re consecrated all my efforts in safeguarding
as much as possible, the dignity of the Ihperor and Russia. 121
erlin Treaty was a is-, m i low tc the Turks. Tt vac tl ~
122
t dlsa 2 3ce since the Treat? of Belgrade In 1718. The loss
of territory, and more important, the loss of key dafenelva araas, r.&rked
123
the end of Turkey* • career in Europe.
The Treaty of Berlin was hallod by its makers, as a great accomplishment
12U
for the sake of humanity. However, one point must be stressed, and that
is the treaty wa3 not drafted for humanitarian reasons in order to save the
oppressed Christians under Turkish rule. Rather, it wa3 only a temporary
settlement based on political expediency.
If the status quo could have been maintained in the Balkans, the
prcvieiona as established by the treaty would probably have provided for
a lone period of peace, however, the Treaty of Berlin was systematically
and openly infringed and i jnored. Large 3tates and snail states, one after
the Other overrode; and evaded stipulations objectionable to them. HIthin
As quoted in: Jelavich, Tsarist Russia , p. lu. Letter, Gorchakov
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sttren years Bulgaria violated the treaty and defied the powers by absorbing
Eastern Roumelia. A year later, Russia repudiated the conditions under which
Batum had been assigned to her, Greece retained far less territory than
was desired for her by the Congress, and had to wait forty years for more
generous treatment. The Porte made no effort to reform the government of
Crete, which resulted in almost constant insurrections. England and France
paid total disregard for the reaffirmation of the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire, and moved more and more into control of Egypt and Tunis respectively.
Finally, in 1908, Austria changed from occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to
outright annexation. And eventually, in 1912, the Balkan powerB took into
125
their own hands the repartition of European Turkey. * In fact, few of the
provisions of the treaty remained in effect for a long period of time.
But, to the interested parties, drafting the peace, it appeared as
though they were accomplishing their purpose. To those who feared Russian
expansion, the treaty was a Justifiable rebuke. To other powers who
zealously eyed the Balkans as a fertile field of expansion, the treaty was
a reprieve designed to enable them to become an heir to the "sick old man."
Those who were for the independence of the Balkan states from their Turkish
masters could mark July 13, 1878 as the date upon which their charters of
126
emancipation were signed and sealed. Finally, to those who looked on the
Balkan situation aa a prelude to war, the treaty was like the dove of peace.
125,
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Arthur Ransome Marriott, The Eastern Question. (Oxfords Clarendon
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CHAPTER VI
"THE DISHONEST BROKER?"
TH11 lift hed UMODed fcftttt ho aould s&rve as the 'Konest IrofceJV11 and
g*14t the pcvnr througfe the Qoogreftfl ci Berlin. «ie would merely be an
BBptri bttvtei ftSfXtrd, :..::l.r:a and Russia, after ail, Get'inajuy w«s UN
crly rovar -rit> * • len* or iutci-esig in the i-asU It was their place
to ftrfl btml -ity at thic Mrtwial tiiie. But was this his true role at the
Conorson? Did he actually preside as the disinterested President, and was
he as aloof in the negotiations preceding the Congress as he pretended
to be? TheM are Lie questions that MOU% be asked about Bismarck during the
/ears 1876-1873.
Despite hie role of the disinterested broker, expecting nothing out of
the Congress*, Bissiarck beliftd he must participate in order to best protect
the int. c« rsets of Qmounp because he was firmly convinced that German se-
curity was at stake. The gains iiussia had made in the Balkans and the inter-
national reaction to the Treaty of Can Sbefano presented Germany with « two-
fold threat. On*-, the peace cf Europe was endangered and two, the security
of Austria was threatened. Botn of these principles were keys to Bismarckian
Icvalgn pel icy •
In order to end this threat to German security, the gains Russia had
made by the Treaty of San Stefano had to be set aside. Therefore, in the
negotiations preceding the Congress, and in the actual meeting of the
powers, Bismarck schemingly and systematically worked to the disadvantage
of Russia. The "Honest Broker" worked to save the peace of Europe and to
'•Ramsay, Foreign Policy , p. 391«
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secure the interests of Austria at Russia's expense for the benefit of
Germany • In other words, the "Honest Broker" took a slight commission for
2
his work. Perhaps Bleichroder, one of Bismarck's few close friends,
summarised the situation best when upon hearing that Bismarck "would play
the honest broker," shook his head thoughtfully, and inspired by age long
3
experience said, "there is no such thing as an honest broker,"
The student of European history might now ask, was not Russia a member
of the Dreikaiserbund? Did not Germany owe Russia a debt of gratitude
for her neutrality as Germany attacked Austria in 1866 and Prance in 1870?
This does not seem to be policy that Prince Bismarck would ever endorse.
The fact is that the Treaty of San Stefano forced Bismarck to reevaluate
Germany's position in Europe, The result of this evaluation called for a
revision of German foreign policy because of three basic factors: fear
of Russian domination in the Balkans, loss of confidence in the Russian
alliance, and belief in Austria as the most natural ally*
h
Bismarck did not want a strong Russia in the Balkans, He feared the
rising tide of the Pan-Slavist movement. This could inundate I ht whole of
Eastern Europe, and force the partitioning of Austria, Germany then isolated
would thus be reduced to a dependent position, ' On top of this, a French-
Russian rapproachment would then become possible, Germany's position would
2
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be that of a second-rate power. Therefore, even though Russia vac a member
of the Dreikaiserbund and eren though her assistance in 18?0 had been as-
sertial, her interests would have to be sacrificed for .erman security.
As mentioned above, shortly after the Andrassy note had been sent,
Bismarck made secret overtures to England, promising her full support
6
for her Eastern policy and. asking nothing in return. In fact, it
appeared as though Bismarck would develop a policy aimed rt a quick
settlement of the crises. ' Then, after the news that Britain would take
the lead in opposing Russia vas announced, Bismarck -withdrew to his
policy of ncnattaehment. This mernt that Russia would be checked but
o
that someone ether than Germany would do the work,
Bismarck* s concern ever the value of Germany* s allisnee with Russia
dates to August, 1876. Gorchakov had forced Bismarck to make a choice
between supporting Austria or Russia when he asked if Russia went to war
o
with Austria, would Germany remain neutral, Bismarck realised that if
the crisis in the East would lead to a Russian-Austrian quarrel he could
not keep on good terms with both of them. He must choof e one or the other.
He said in his memoirs:
If we remain neutral when Russia and Austria come to blows, the
aereated combatant will never forgive us. Should Austria be crushed,
that would not profit us. Of course we could annex German Austria,
10
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but what could we do with the Slavs and Hungarian*? Public opinion
would not tUoOJ U to fifcht lg< ftttftriftj ftaMia peoll bt g;rave
menace to ua if Austria were to perish) we can hold Russia in check
*x\\i with Austria's aid* 11
The Oftoltt between the t^o ;?as e decision of gr«tat importance io Bismarck,
He attempted to sound Sorchakov as to how far ftissia wo lid go with Germany.
He Mhttf that in | tl irn for the MOlOtOBfi of Germany in th: bast, would
12
Bnttll piBTOTflW lo Geraa ly tho poser.sion of Alsace-Lorraine. This
V9014 "jo a sionumentol guarantee for QoiMuy* T^e territory *0> from France
in the Frinoo-Pmsr-i?i Var vrr.!'". ''dve the promised protection of Russia.
German) would then bs freo from worry §!% a French war of revenro* How-
aver, the- Rasr.ians *ere silent on tho proposal. Bisrcnrck regarded this as
a todal* 13
AHHfleljfl Bismarck was willing to corae to a close understating with
-is, and to support- thea in an aggressive policy in the Bolkt&ta However,
Bitssarck a-f-de his price bl^U Gertn.au support of Russia in the 3ast would be
given only in return for support of German policy against .^rance. This
dtsir* wss apparent rfhen Biesarok HOif a tsecovA attempt to secure u ac 1"6**
asent with Russia. In the latter part of August, 18?\>, Manteuffel -«bs sent
to BnmIi lo ioggttt a treaty of slli3r.ee between Russia and Germany on
the terms of freedom of action a-ainst France in return for Qtna support
of Eussia in the Sasterc Question. Ag&in, Al:?xand*r II refused to entertain
+v> wwv^tle'ia 14 7he path was now clear to Bismarck. If the Eastern
**sli qooVM ittl Kamsay, ?oreig,n Policy , p. 391.
12CV*olidge, QrV/rg of uhc Alliance, p. 1G2.
13Itid., p. 102.
%bid. , p. 100.
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problem reached threatening proportions his choice must be Austria. Russian
silence to Bum arartaffaa forces iixiu to f§/Ut4 Austria as the most natural
ally. Biautrek i IsfcalBas' that tta Bad bonefafely pat oi.f tali aaalaa until
he aaa forced la sain it aj >atla*l thr^a tuning toadurt aftof tAS Congress
.-'orlin. "•* The f^ct is that he! ius decision in Austria's i*a*cr in
Kay 1??£ when he Bupport*4 Jtaatrla at th« 2-erlin iie-3tin& ex the tnree
-os, w.d in October i3?6 ahatt ht lafafa4 Itassia he .roold not allow
la*
either part? W amffar * .lecisi/e dafaat La «» orial of anas* ~
Ona I ifht that leapt raeorrlag in ftijaaarak'a mind auring tne period
when he wmA La ijc:'.iion, a a '© <>f 1375. As mentioned oe^ore,
t.ic Iron Ghanoalleff 'aas not tha ^aa ba faffgat « bad burn and still less a
1?
.OB v.s he had received £ran Oorchakov in bin own capital. Bis-
mfcr-ci'.
'
ttttda toward Gcvchakov' u action is revealed ay tuia statement:
he chose in 1375 tc invent aaa I ranati aaajnif allafclag an *c aliaaHairi
is ordi a tc poaa as paaaaaaJtoar of Sarapaj I *al4 him th*t, though I should
aafitinoa to value the aXXlaaaa af «.ust;ia # all confidence was at an end
aatwaaa us.* This much la certain, the Wsr Scare* ox 18?5 left a aeep
19
trr •• \ • ,--5narck , a mind. Kutsian action in this incident maue on» other
*5Ftt!iar« Edawarak'a Diplomacy. . 6,
* i - »i i » i tin < rf
'-"T'.tler, Bismarck , g » 2J*>« 0* SaptaafcajT 23» 1676 # a clear response
appeared in the fieichsanzeiger j the Empires public voice* An article arv
nc ••••? • * that C-*-r?-2H i- 4 . rr,-:V= v.or.- ;/b concerned in the Fasten* Question! ?"<he
Imperial Government intended merely to sup .ort the wishes of the two allies
and it refuted to tako a fr~- :xwev radaf its tutelage in regard to the
affairs of Turkey. Harris, A Diplomatic History , p. 78.
3
1
'Ramsay, Foreign Policy, p. 379.
Butler, Bismarck , p. 230.
^'l.udwig, Lismarck. p. 510.
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point very clear to Bismarck, In case of a Franco-German war, Germany
could not count upon the moral support or even the inaction of Russia.
Friendly as Alexander II was to Germany, it was plainly against the interests
of Russia that France should once more be crushed and weakened. The Czar
now had shown that he wished to maintain the existence of France as a great
20
power, however inconvenient to Germany, On this point Bismarck said:
That for Russian policy there is a limit beyond which the im-
portance of France in Europe must not be decreased is explicable. That
limit was reached, as I believe, at the peace of Frankfort—a fact
which in 1870 and 71 was not so completely realized by St, Petersburg
as five years later, I hardly think that during our war the Russian
Cabinet clearly foresaw that, when it was over, Russia would have as
a neighbor so strong and consolidated a Germany, 21
From October 1876, Bismarck realized that the Russian alliance, upon
which he had leaned so heavily since the day he first took power, had lost
22
much of its value* Germany* I future would best be served through a firm
understanding with Austria,
At a result of his decision, Bismarck had no intention of supporting
23
Russia in the negotiations preceding the Congress or at the meeting itself.
This fact is declared when in October I876, Bismarck said; "the whole thing
is an attempt to make us sign a blank cheque which Russia will fill in, and
cash for use against Austria and England," "
Even though Bismarck refused to support Russia he did not want an open
20Coolidge, Origins of the Alliance , p. 65.
21^
As quoted in: Coolidge, Origins of the Alliance , p, 6$ ,
2?
"Sontag, Germany and England , p. 152.
^Ramsay, Foreign Policy , p. 382.
2liAs quoted int Ludwig, Bismarck , p. 513.
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2*
quarrel with her. Much care had to be taken not to drive her into the
arms of the French. As a result, in his actions in 1877 and 1878, Bismarck
did nothing to anger the Russians, with the exception of annoying and
26
humiliating Gorchakov or an occasional outburst of temper. Thus, when a
crucial point would develop between the powers, Bismarck would adopt an
attitude of lofty neutrality which was only a mask for his support of
27
Austria, Russia, unable to stand alone against Austria and England, was
forced to concede at the diplomatic table. Without Germany she was iso-
lated because the Treaty of San Ste.fano was in conflict with the interests
of Austria and England, Of his role at the Congress in regard to Russia,
Bismarck said:
In carrying out the decrees of the Congress, Russia expected and
required that, in local discussions about them in the East, when there
was any difference of opinion between Russian and other interpretations,
the German commissions should, on principle support Russia, In many
questions the objective decisions might certainly be fairly indiffer-
ent to us j therefore, it was only incumbent on us to explain the
stipulations honestly, and not to disturb our relations with the other
great powers by party support of local questions that did not effect
German interests, 28
The factor that enabled Bismarck to develop this policy was that Russia
was too weak to prolong the war. The conflict had cost Russia two million
rubles per day and the losses from casualties and disease were increasing.
Even more serious was the revival of nihilism and terrorism inside the
29
country. This weakness was evident when the Grand Duke Nicholas refused
2$
Butler, Bismarck , p, 379.
26
Coolidge, Origins of the Alliance , p. HUu
27
Ibid., p. lliiu
28
Butler, Bismarck , p. 379.
29
Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin , p. 20.
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30
to occupy Constantinople. ' If Russia refused to negotiate the Treaty of
San Stefano she would have to face the combined forces of England and
Austria. Besides, the Turkish army was still in fighting trim and Roumania,
angered by the Russians demanding the secession of Bessarabia, would have
31
joined the conflict, Bismarck gave evidence of this reasoning when he
wrote Andrassyt
If Austria-Hungary is given a free nana against Russia, which she
has merited if Russia fails to keep her promise, 32 and if Austria-
Hungary comes to an agreement with England, Czar Alexander must perforce
realise that the work of his valiant soldiers has been distorted by the
exacting rather than skillful behavior of his statesmen. 33
Bismarck gave further evidence in his memoirs. He said:
The desire of the Russian government to arrive at a peace with
Turkey by means of a Congress, proved that they did not feel them-
selves strong enough on the military side to let the matter cone to
a war with England and Austria) after they had once let slip the
opportunity of occupying Constantinople. 3U
The only Russian salvation wopld be Bismarck turning against Austria
and identifying himself with Russia. Bismarck had no intention of doing
36
this. In the negotiations preceeding the Congress, he refused to support
Russian policies on five major decisions.
30Qnau, The Memoirs of Count M. Ignatyev
. p. 111.
31
Andrassy, Bismarck, Andrassy and their Successors , p. 29.
32
Bismarck made reference to the Treaty of Reichstadt and Russia's
disregard of it.
33
Andrassy, Bismarck, Andrassy and their Successors , p. 30. Prince
Bismarck to Count Andrassy, January 30, It 7b".
3U
Butler, Bismarck , p. 236.
35
Andrassy, Bismarck, Andrassy and their Successors , p. 29.
"56
Ramsay, Foreign Policy , p. 387.
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First, Bismarck refused to support the program Gorchakov presented at
the Berlin Conference held Hay 11, until May 20, 1876, He backed Andrassy
to the point that Russia was forced to yield. In part, fear of a Russian-
French rapproachment guided Bismarck. Gorchakov renewed his interest in
France with the most ardor he had shown since the War Scare of l87i>. He
had expressed hope that France should return to a significant role in
European affairs and he even suggested a French admiral be given command
37
of a proposed international fleet. This fear prompted Bismarck to sup-
port the desires of Andrassy even at this early date in the Eastern Question.
Secondly, in October 1876, the question of an armistice between Turkey
and the insurgents was raised. Russia proposed a six weeks period while
Turkey, with the support of the powers, proposed one for a six months
period. Bismarck supported the longer armistice thus knowing that Russia
would have to stand alone.
A third incident in which Germany withheld support from Russia was in
the proposal for an international fleet to be sent to the Bosphorus, which
was mentioned earlier. Bismarck refused, saying, "we have no apparent
38
interest to justify us in mobilizing our sea forces in other parts •"
Bismarck also refused to support Russia in their approach to Germany
over what their attitude would be if Austria and Russia were involved
in war. Here, Bismarck refused to give the Russians any hint of sup-
port. He answered, "they could not allow either of their friends to be
37
^Harris, A Diplomatic History , p. 37£.
38
Dugdale, German Documents , p. 20. Memorandum of Prince Bismarck,
October U, 1876.
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39
hurt by an armed conflict • "
A fifth German refusal to Russian overtures for support occurred in
November, 1876, General von Werder, German advisor in St. Petersburg told
Bismarck that, "Emperor Alexander II expresses doubt as to whether England
would remain quiet in the event of an all-out war. The Emperor trust*? in
that case, your majesty will exert all influence to dissuade England from
taking a hostile attitude."
Bismarck's reply was clearly a rejection of any Russian hope of German
aid. He said:
There is no need to explain at length why we cannot conceive the
possibility of making war on England for the sake of Russia. There
would be no practical object to be gained even in raising it as a
threat, for Russia's land frontier on our side would be protected by
our neutrality, and if it were admissible that Germany, purely out
of sympathy for Russia, might declare war on England, it would react
to the disadvantage of Russia, since the harbours of Memel, Stettin
and Edrine would be blockaded and the unquestionable superior land
forces of Russia could not be reinforced by the German land power, hi
In each of these five points, a flick of Bismarck's finger could have
transferred German support so that in each of the five situations Russia
could have adopted a more aggressive policy. But, without German support
they were forced to accept negotiations. Therefore, in the years preceding
the Congress, Bismarck could profess aloofness and in the Congress itself,
he could pose as the honest broker, knowing that Russia would have to yield
to the English and Austrians. The years 1877 and 1878 and the Berlin Congress
were to Bismarck as an historical novel. He started to read it knowing how
39
""Butler, Bismarck , p. 23U.
^)ugdale, German Documents , p. 3ii. Memorandum of Prince Bismarck,
October h, 1876.
^Ibid.
, p. 3U.
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the story would turn out.
Nevertheless, Prince Bismarck posed as the defender of Russian interests
at the Congress. He felt it was a way for Russia to surrender the Treaty
of San Stefano without losing face. After the Congress was over, he even
pretended shocked when Russia launched a furious press attack against him.
Here is where Bismarck must be described as being slightly dishonest. He
could win Russian friendship by taking their side over details which re-
mained in dispute while knowing that Russia would be forced to give in.
W. H. Medlicott, in his book, The Congress of Berlin and After , lists
the areas where Bismarck actually supported Russia at the expense of Austria
and England at the Congress of Berlin. Some of the more notable were:
1. As Fresident he used his authority to bully the Turks to
Russia 1 s interests.
2. In polite language he vetoed many demands of the Austrians
and British.
3. At the first meeting he refused to allow Britain to completely
protest Russian troops in the Constantinople area.
U. At the fifth meeting he supported Schuvalov' s arguments against
a mixed occupation of Christian and Moslem troops in Bulgaria.
5>. At the sixth meeting he expressed annoyance over Salisbury's
haggling over details of the Bulgarian settlement.
6. At the ninth setting he opposed the hearing of the Roumanians
who protested against Russian demands for Bessarabia.
7. Tn the two serious disputes involving the Bulgarian frontier
and Batum, he undertook personally the task of go-between,
sounding the British and Austrians, intervening at times on his
own initative with proposals in Russia^ interest and giving
her repeatedly the support of his ingenuity and authority.
8. As President he was able to accelerate business and prevent
departures from the preliminary agreements, and in this way
saved the Russians from many adverse decisions on matters of
detail to which their isolated position rendered them liable. h$
1 ?
Seton Watson, The Eastern Question , p. U6U.
^Taylor, Bismarck , p. 176.
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%edlicott, The Congress of Berlin , p. 12?.
Ill
'.». in tup -orted liussis on the few DOOaaleai id
j.f
Austria came into timet conflict. u ^ Hi -"'obably ealeulated that t'
Austri'-'- - - - 1 a I f ^r poffltloo tc nil UP lad !•• likely to reoont a
few diplomatic rabnffa*
'4
Ihlf point I • : led in a letter written by I-ord
Elliot to Lord Seliabary In September 1879 1 "Andraeey bold Blliet iv b
Salisbury nd all tba other plenipotentiej i«s could bear vitataaj that the
results of the Cengreea vara eertainly net dno to Prince -'ck'g apporti
but vera wholly tttrlbntable to tha aomblaad effort and resolutions of
LB
England and Austri-,
A typical aethod in which Bleaerek prorloa ra ort for Russia is
provided Lot Raaphrey Banner i r -. hie book, Ruscl? and the Palkans.
1870J.880.
Vhen OorchakOT propoaad that tha powora develop a collective
laafaatae *'or tha Treaty of 3erlin, Bianarek rejected tha idea but
anaoanea I Im eai not oppoaad t-o an article laying doan the right oi
the powe*** to control by their representatives in -lrkey, tha exe-
cution of the Treaty, He continued in cauticus support of the Russians
and, when it came finally to voting upon the modified formula, he vas
the Only one to accept it—knowing that its defeat W83 certain. k9
Another exanple is provioed which shows Bismarck's clever handling of
Russia. Z:\ the seventeenth of June, the setting was cpeneu with the question
of admitting Oreece and Balgaria to the Congress. * Bismarck suggested that
the proposals be iisc-usssd in detail so private meetings between Resale and
^6ibid
. , p. 130.
*" Ibid., p. 130,
I £4 Ibid
., p. 130. Lord Elliot to Lord Salisbury, September U, 1879.
Sumner, Russia find the J-pIka??a
. p. 553
•
^Brltlah State Papers, p. MS, Protocol Number 2, June 17, 1876.
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i'ritain were established. Thereupon, Andrassy interposed to demand the
preserce of the Austrians at the meeting. This was accepted by Bismarck.
Thus Bismarck had avoided himself proposing t^et the Russians should be
51
outnumbered.
One other detail adds evidence to Fismarck's plans. He was careful to
imrres? upon Schuvalcv, he corId not support the Russians more insistently
against the combined opposition of the British and Austrians lest they
52
should disrupt the Congress and leave. Tn public Bismarck ?ave every
53
appearance of being a well-wisher of Russia. With this type of action
Bismarck could claim that he had supported the Russians. He remarked after
the Congress, Hmy conduct at the Congress was such that T thought, after it
was over, well, if I had not got long ago the highest Russian order set in
51i
prescious stones, T ought to get it now."
Friedrich von Holstein, in his memoirs, gave rome insight into this
picture. He said, "Prince Bismarck's main intention at the Congress was
to teach the Russians a lesson, to make it clear to them that their plans
could not be executed without his consent, and that his consent depended
55
on the conduct of the Russian government."
Therefore, Russia's conduct after 1P75 was not sufficient to satisfy
Bismarck. As a result, he lost confidence in his alliance with Russia and
51
Sumner, Russia and the Balkans , p. 519
•
52Ibid., p. 512.
^3Ibid
., p. $12.
^As quoted in: Coolidge, Origins of the Alliance , p. 129.
Rich and Fischer, The Holstein Papers , p. 117.
113
in the years prior to the Con, ress withheld support by playinp the role of
the neutralist. Then la the Confress he supported Russia on minor details
while at the same time, realized that Russia would be forced to ^ive in.
Bismarck nas not the "Honest Broker" but entered the Cor ress in order to
carry out a clear-cut policy. Russian interests hao to be sacrificed for
n an security.
CHAPTER VTI
Ol AFTERMATH
When Bismarck left for Kissingen on July Hi, 1878, he was satisfied with
the outcome of the Congress. He assumed he had pleased everybody. In August
he wrote King Ludwig of Bavaria that the danger of a break between Austria
and Russia had been averted and that Germany's relations with both remained
unimpaired. He constantly upheld the view that he had done a service to a
foreign power such as a foreign minister rarely has the chance of doing.
In Bismarck's estimation, even Russia, the nation who next to Turkey
suffered most by the Treaty of Berlin, had made some gains. Bulgaria, though
disunited could hope for new unitv, and Russia could hope to enjoy popularity
there. By remaining friendly with Bulgaria, Russia could be within striking
distance of the Straits. On top of this, there had been a drastic weak-
ening of the Ottoman ?inpire. She would no longer have to be considered a
foreign threat. A letter written by M de Giers to H. G. Jomini, senior
advisor to the Foreign Minister, pointed out the Russian attitude while the
Congress was in sessions
Nekilov is right in telling you. that the effort of our plenipotenti-
aries to bring the work of the Congress to a good result are appreciated
here in hi^h circles. The impossibility of obtaining more is recognized
and provided that an agreement is reached on the question of Batum, they
will be perfectly satisfied—and indeed with reason...the independence
of three Principalities, the creation of Bulgaria... no more rajah and
so many other things. My Godi Would we not have treated as mad aryone
who would have dreamed of such a result two years ago? 2
Seton Watson, The Eastern Question , p. U6£.
2
Jelavich, Tsarist Russia , p. 1$. M da Giers to Jomini, St. Petersburg,
June 23/July $, W?$l
U5
By the tiice the Congress was over, the Russian attitude had changed.
The R gains were disc fchf -re influential elemrnt of the
•jiia.n Press and public. The Ps^-Sla r±« pro r eould IM ataH defeat
at the conference taMe. Tvan S. Aksakov, one of the most influential
Russian writers denounced the dlMMBbmwnt of Orttttr Mlfarll "' Utfi to
the loss of Russian domination of Constant -' nople end the
straits area. Equally unfor^ ivea'lo was the abandonment of the province
3
of Bosnia-Heriiegovina to Catholic, Gerven Austria. F) cy searched for
scapegoats and found two, the Russian ministers, notably Schuvalov, and
Prince Jisn,arck.
Sc l lm ore the brunt of the Russian's failure at the Congress. He
h
was judged 2s an incompetent dupe of London and Vienna. This attitude
was undoubtedly due to the work of Gorchakov who managed to poison the Czar's
mind toward Scnuvslov. Gorchakov had left Herlin immediately 8t the close
of the Congress and ha i been in conference with him. Schuvalov, on the other
hand, had made the acquaintance of a too facile lady, froT1 whose arms it was
difficult to entice him, ^y the time he did fet back to the Czar, opinion
had been set egainst h±»» An account of Schuvalov' s first meeting w^th the
Czar is ^iven by a Russian Aide de Ca-ip, BtftMl von Uneer S timberg;
T was or. duty that day when Peter Schuvalov cane into the Aide-de
Camp's room with his head held hifch and highly pleased with himself
and desired to be announced to His I'aiesty, Ten minutes later the
audience was over. What a change had passea over him. If the scene
had not been so trajic.T should coTpare Count Peter Schuvalov to a
poodle who had a pail of water thrown over it. He was quite besides
3
Ibid
., p. 17.
Ibid
. , p. 1,.
Dunlap, ? emoirs of Prince von Bulow . p. 1*5>7»
116
himself, white as a sheet. With a trembling voice and every sign of
agitation, he whispered to me, "I have been very vilely calumnicated
...by Gorchakov, that corrupted and malicious old man," 6
Schuvalov had defended himself valiantly against the charges of being
Bismarck's dupe as Russian public opinion claimed, especially, after seeing
the painting of the Congress of Berlin. In this painting Bismarck is shown
in the center of the picture shaking Schuvalov' s hand. General von
7Winterfield commented that, "This painted handshake broke Schuvalov' s neck."
Schuvalov had stressed that the Treaty of San Stefano had not been set aside.
The major area where it differed was in the partitioning of Bulgaria, He
further took the position that -ismarck had supported Russian opinion in the
three major crises—the Bulgarian frontier, the fate of Sofia and the cession
Q
of Batum, Nevertheless, Schuvalov was too late. Public opinion was so
against him that he was forced to resign, his political career all but
9
ended.
At the time of the Treaty of Berlin, Russia was troubled internally.
The reforms of Alexander II had been far from successful. Instead of ending
the internal problems, the reforms had too often raised false hooes and led
to new difficulties. The war had been a tremendous strain on the Russian
treasury which was pressed to find new sources of income to meet the in-
creasing cost of government. The disillusionment of the Russians caused many
Seton 'atson, The Eastern Question , p. U6!u This painting of the
Congress by Anton von Werner, can be seen in Sumner, Rnssia and the Balknns .
p. 500,
7Ibid., p. U6U.
Robertson, Bismarck , p. 3h2,
o
'Jeiavich, Tsarist Russia, p, 17.
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to look for revolutionary and rauical solutions of their nation's problems.
The increase of un ina activity and violence added to the instability
of the state. Then, the economic steps Germany had take- tlnftt Russian
agricultural exports added fuel to the fire. It would be t - a*s
interest to direct this discontent to tho Treaty of 3erlin and to find a
scapegoat outside the country. This role was assigned to the Iron Chancellor
of Germany, Otto von BiMATtk*
1 79 a full scale press war W3r launched against Germany. The
11
Russian paper Golos led the attack against Bismarck, The Nationalists'
party in Russia, aided by the great war of Pan-Slavism, proclaimed that
. isir.arck had instigate I the Russia.) attach on Turkey, in order to favrr
12
Austria ar.i rob Russia of its victory. Czar Alexander, at the August
manoeuvres told General von Schweinitz, "In the questions still outstanding
from lot Congress, Germany everywhere tock the side of Austria igtlnst
Russia. If you want the friendship which has linked U3 for a hundred years
13
to continue, you should alter this." !e also stated that he intended to
write rinperor William I about it. Be sent a threatening letter to Car.-.any
Ik
knowr. as the "T?oac on the ear letter." The two most inportart points of
this letter were, "If refusal to adapt the German vote to the Russian is
adhered to, peace between us cannot last," and, "Your Majesty's Chancellor
10
Robertson, 3isnarck . p. 3u2.
"^Seton Watson, The Eastern Question , p. h69.
12
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15
has forpotten the promises of 1^70." T n this letter, Czar Alexander
further stated*
T understard perfectly V :t ou are arxicus to nointoil e - ?od
relations with Austria, but I do not understand why it is to the inter-
est of Germany to sacrifice those of Russia. Tt is Wrtl I real
statesman to put into the scale a personal quarrel when it is a question
of the interests of two erect §ti tfl lit 4th
one another, and when one of them rendered tne other, in lb 70, a service
which 8CCordirr' to your own words, ycu said you MfflOf Mould ft ...
the situation is becoming too serious for me to conceal from you
the fears that are BOM I of consequences that mi* t is*
astrous to our countries. 16
This letter was accompanied by a huge build-up of Russian forces and
a massing of troops on the Eastern border of Germany, Bismarck gave an
estimate ox their strength:
They are making, immense preparations in Russia, having increased
their forces by U00,000 men, as won as the peace footing cf the
German army, xhey can now put twenty-four new divisions into the field,
that is, twelve army corps. And a mass of cavalry is stationed HOOT
the Western frontier which could pour in upon us in three days. 17
Bismarck pretended to be furious at these reproaches, stating that he
had only involved himself in the Eastern Question at all out of very special
18
consideration for the Czar. In fact, Bismarck regarded the Congress as
a device for paring the face of the Russians. They could make to European
opinion the concessions which woula seem humiliating if made to British and
Austrian threats. Even while the Con-ress was being conducted had not
19
Bismarck sided with Russia over the major issues? r.arck placed port
15
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of the blame for Russia's failure on not having a clear-cut policy. Ke said,
20
"we could not make demands for Russia, which s^e had not made I ."
He also claimed that the one ripgMU le for this Russian policy was
C-orchakov. He said, "with thir !~ ;orchakov is not carry1n~ or a Busillflfl policy.
He always wanted to cut a fipure and to be praised v:" the fore*; pr< tfj and
21
particular, the Parisian newspapers," ''hen, in his memoirs, f-ismarck
summarized the darper that would have accompanied Russian support: " Tv- St,
Pcttre'ur expected us to look after their interests unconaitionally
to support all of their demands. We eould not do that however, as rone
22
of their were unfair anc danperous."
Tn retaliation to the Russian chtr , 3ismarck instructed Fusch to
answer the Russian charp.es. An article entitled, "The uorchakov Policy"
23
then appeared in Number 11 of the Grertzboten , After this the wires between
r; t. Petersburg and Berlin were not broken hut made rec hot with recriri-
2ii
nations.
The turn of Russian opinion arainst him, and the Czar's hostile attitude,
awoke in Bismarck all of the old fears of Germany isolated tad encircled by
a hostile coalition. He confesseo that he was afflicted by the "nirhtmare
25
of coalitions," This fear was brourht out by a statement in his meroirs:
20
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At the time I *./as extremely anxious on account of Russia and
feared an alliance between her and Austria, which the Frtnofe would
have joined, Lately the Russians ha i written us brutal letters (The
box on the ear letter) threatening us in case we aid not support them
in the astern ft raid Q end X thought they could not act that way
unless they had Austria as a pood friend who rcirht become an ally.
They had also endeavoure. to bring about as alliiaBi in ^aris through
Obrutscheff. 26
Once ap;ain Bismarck >^e?ar to search for allies as insurance against a
Russiar-led coalition. Briefly, he ordered Count tfunster to approach
land ar to what their ttitude would be if Germany went to war against
27
Russia. To these German proposals, Lord Heaconsfield replied, "If
Russia attacked Germany and Austria, Germany might rely on our being on her
side. I said, I suppose the service you want of us would be to influence
France and Italy to observe neutrality... I was pretty sure we could prevent
28
any French government from joining- Russia against him."
After Bismarck received this answer, the matter was dropped Just as it
had been in 1176. As states earlier, Bloaarok had arrived at the conclusion
t at Austria would be his choice as an ally. Neither England, Italy nor
Russia could offer Germany the advantages that Austria could. This was a
choice Bismarck had to make. On the Gne hand Russia could insure strong
traditional family policy and the advantage of stability, but on the other
29
hand Austria could offer racial similarity and many other valuable points.
Bismarck wa3 aware of the sound argument for a close understanding with
26
Busch, Bismarck , p. 222.
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Russia, In his memoirs be stated!
In ;oint of material force, T btld a union witv m la to have the
advantage, T had also ; een used to re put4 it as safer, because I placed
more reliance or. trtdltj P, on a ccmmunit/ of
monarchial instincts and the absence of indigenous political divisions,
than or the fits ar.i starts of pu' lie opinion tnonj U ians, Slav
and Catholic population of the monarchy of the IlapsBurgs, 30
However, when all of the facts wore veijrhed, Bismarck sei ctci .\:stria
as the pivotal Doint of his policy. The actual sijrH Bg f g^ rtn»i \Hiance
between Gemany and Auatr- took place in August 1879, Tn reality it was
dated October 9, lbVo. Nevertheless, Bismarck's choice between Austria
33
ana Russia was made long before. Therefore, the interests of Austria
were Bismarck's prii.e concern ring the astern Crisis,
Bismarck selected Austrie as his basic ally for a number of reasons
but heading the list was his fear of France and the possibility of Germany
facing a hostile coalition. On these points, Austria was more vital to
German interests than was Russia. Bisr.arck declared, MTf we sacrificed our
relations with all the other powers to the firtmes!? of our alliance with
Russia, we should find ourselves With 90T exposed ; hicrl situation, in
a d£ -serous dependence on Russia in the event of an acute mani.festc.ti on if
a French and Austrian desire for revenue," Again, Bismarck shower that
t'.ese two points were on his mind when he saidt
...if, under the influence of Russian threats, the uncertainty of
i>ler, Bismarck , p. 256.
^4bid., p. 260.
"Vuller, Bismarck ' s Diplomacy , p, 7,
"'"
Ioid
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the attachment of Germany, Austria finally seeks an entente cordiale
with either France or Russia, Germany would be in darker of entire
isolation on the Continent. Supposing however, that Austria vere to
effect an entente corotiale with France and England as in l8£lt, Germany,
unless prepared for isolation, would be forced to unite with Russia
alone, and, as I fear, to follow in the mistaken and perilous course of
Russian domestic and foreign policy. 35
The basic fear of Bismarck was that by leaning to Russia he might find
himself up against an Austro-Hungarian-English-French alliance, which if not
36
a desperate, would be a dangerous situation. ' When making this choice,
Bismarck* s distrust of Russia was a very large factor in influencing his
decision. He said:
If the German policy confined its possibilities to the Russian
alliance, and, in accordance with the wishes of Russia, refused all
other states, Germany would with regard to Russia be in an unequal
position because the geographical position and the autocratic consti-
tution of Russia makes it easier for her to give up the alliance than
it would be for us.. .and a Russo-German alliance depends upon the
mood of the reigning Snperor of Russia. 37
Another factor influenced Bisniarck in his choice, and that was that
Germany had more in common with Austria. On this subject he said, "The
sensible portion of the U2 ,000,000 Germans would prefer to have a good under-
standing with both Russia and Austria. But if one is obliged to choose
38between them, everything points to Austria, national reasons and others."
Finally, 3ismarck did not hesitate to pick Austria. Together the two
countries would be strong militarily. On this subject Bismarck saidt
Russia is strong enough alone and we cannot be of much assistance
3
^Ibid., p. 26iu
36
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to her. Austria is the weaker of the two, although at the same time a
valuable ally, and we can be of assistance to her. She can also
strengthen our policy of peace. Vhen we are united, with our two
million soldiers back to back, they with their Nilihiem will doubtless
think twice before they diflturl the peace. 39
The advantages to be gained from an alliance with Austria over Russia
could be summarized as follows: With Austria there was more of a community
of interests, at least with the Magyars and Germans, and with the latter
there was a community of blood; up until this time Russia had always been
friendly, and she might still be won back, whereas any break with Austria
would reopen the wound of 1866, perhaps so unrepairably as to throw them
back into the arms of the French j and Germany would be the senior partner in
an Austro-German alliance, whereas in a Russo-German alliance, the Slavs
might hold the whip hand, particularly if the Austrians were on the other
side. Then, as far as the status quo of Europe was concerned, an alliance
with Austria opened the possibilities of an alliance with England, which
would be precluded by an alliance with Russia. Bismarck also felt he must
act quickly in securing an Austro-German alliance, because there was an
impending change in the Austrian ministry, which Bismarck feared might
result in an alliance between Austria and Russia to the exclusion of Germany.
Finally, 1879 found Austria as the more stable of the two powers. German
security would be best served through an alliance with Austria.
The German Chancellor then instigated negotiations with Count Andrassy
of Austria. The two met at Gastin August 27-28, 1879* in order to formulate
Uo
the treaty. However, all Germany was not in favor of breaking so
39Ibid., p. 228.
k°Butler, Bismarck , p. 260.
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completely with Russia in favcr of Austria. Prince Hohenlohe expressed his
views when In declared, "I do rot trast Austria nor do T n§u4 Rursia as
seriously hostile. Lastly, I believe that an alliance with Austria would
hi
result in one between Russia and France."
The Emperor William I was also hostile to an Austro-German alliance.
At the time Bismarck and Andrassy were at Gastin, the Kaiser went to
Alorsndrovo to stress to the Czar that Germany's position had been mis-
represented. When he heard of the Bismarck-Ancrassy meeting he wrotet
Germany and Austria are desirious of attaining the same end-
security against unprovoked attacks by foreign forces. But owing to
the special mention oi' Russia as the foe, I cannot agree to t! e present
proposals... after agair- extending the hand in friendship to the tr.peror
Alexander after the removal of understanding.. •Am I to conclude an al- . -
liar.ee against him?... I cannot be guilty of sach an act cf disloyalty.
Eimarck gave evie'erce of his; choice of Austria over Russia in 1S76,
and his feelings that Russia would not be his most natural ally when he
stated: "For His Majesty, the attitude recently adopted by the Emperor
Alexander, has for the first time illuminated, as with a lightning flash,
a situation, which I have been repeatedly oblige: to recognize during the
past few years."
For a time it appeared as though the proposed treaty would go for naught.
The Chancellor threatened to resign if it was not accepted and the Ekperor
threatened to abdicate. Bismarck was able to prevail when he referred the
Ul
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question to the German Cabinet:
In order to secure the Emperor's approval for the treaty which
I had concluded with Andrassy...I was compelled to bring the cabinet
into play, a method of procedure extremely against my grain. I
succeeded, however, in gaining approval of my colleagues. ..Count
Stolberg was sent to Baden Baden to negotiate with the Emperor. The
Emperor was not convinced by the argument of the policy, but gave the
promise to ratify the treaty only because he was averse to ministerial
changes. h5
Count Andrassy was definitely for the treaty. In the words of Prince
Hohenlohe, "When he first heard of it he jumped right up to the ceiling for
joy." Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria had also thrilled to the news of
the treaty. Bismarck went to Vienna to secure the old Emperor's approval on
the treaty. When he arrived and requested an audience, Bismarck said Franz
Joseph, "came especially on my acco nt to Vienna from his shooting box,
adopted all of my ideas, and was prepared to do everything I proposed in the
interest of peace." "
The major provisions of the treaty, called the Dual Alliance, were de-
fensive in nature. If either Germany or Austria-Hungary were attacked by
Russia, or by another power supported by Russia, the other would come to its
aid. In the event of an attack by another power (such as an Italian attack
on Austria or a French attack on Germany) the other contracting power /aid
) ft
at least remain neutral.
The Austro-German alliance once again ended the threat of German
^Butler, Bismarck , p. 271.
^As quoted in: Chrystal, Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe . p. 2£2.
^Busch, Bismarck , p. 22U.
k^Kowat, The Concert of Europe , p. 72.
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isolation on the continent of Europe, The Russian threats after the Congress
of Berlin had forced Bismarck to make the decision to side with Austria,
This alliance, concluded August 28, 1879 and signed by the two contracting
powers October 7, 1879 % remained the cornerstone of both German and Austrian
policy until ForId War I. ^
Russia now found herself alone and isolated and from her experience in
the Crimean War, this was a fatal condition. The leading members of the
Russian government initiated a series of meetings in which they reviewed the
entire diplomatic scene. The conclusion reached was that the threat from
Britain overshadowed all other considerations. Great Britain was firmly
entrenched in Egypt and Cyprus, therefore, if the Ottoman Empire should
crumble rapidly, Britain was in an excellent position to seize strategic
areas of Russian interest, *
Since the Congress of Berlin, leadership of Russian policy had changed,
Gorchakov, due to age and ill health played no part in Russian foreign
policy. The direction of foreign policy was influenced most by N, K, Giers,
D. A. Miliutin, Minister of War and P. S, Saburov, Russian Minister at
Berlin, The duties as Foreign Minister fell into the hands of N, K. Giers,
Although he did not assume the title of office until 1882, he had functioned
as Foreign Minister after 1878.
A career diplomat, he had served in posts within the Ottoman Empire,
in Moldavia, Wallachia, Constantinople, and Egypt, and later in Paris
^Ibid., p. 72.
5°Jelavich, Tsarist Russia , p, 19,
Sllbid., p. 17.
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Switzerland and Sweden. In 1875 he was brought back to St. Petersburg as
assistant to the Minister of Foreign .Affairs and as Director of the Asiatic
Department. He realized that an adventurous policy was impossible for a
militarily weak and economically unstable country. Security in Europe and
52
at the Straits became the cornerstone of his policy.
Russia* 8 interest could best be served with ar. alliance with Germany.
A treaty with Germany could close the major loopholes in the Russian defenses
and allow the nation a period of peace in which to repair the damage of the
late war and to deal with the pressing problems of internal reform. A
hostile coalition against Russia could be prevented and support for Russia
in the Straits policy could all be realized by an approach to Germany.
Therefore, on February 5» 1880 de Saburov opened negotiations with Bismarck
over the possibility of a renewal of the Dreikaiserbund .
To Bismarck this was a fulfillment of his policy. Immediately after
concluding the Dual Alliance he had said, "The dangers to our union with
Austria can be minimized by keeping the strictest possible faith with Austria,
and at the same time taking care that the road from Berlin to St. Petersburg
is not closed."
"
Again he gave evidence that this is what he hoped for when he saidi
In deciding between the Russian and the Austrian alliance T gave
preference to the latter, it was not that I was in any degree blind
to the perplexities which made the choice difficult. I regarded it
felbid
., p. 17.
53Ibid., p. 23.
^Dugdale. German Documents , p. 108. Memorandum by Prince Bismarck
February 6, I6o0.
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as no less enjoined upon us to cultivate neighborly relations with
Russia after, than before our defensive alliance with Austria. $6
Bismarck was ready to conclude the agreement with Russia at once but
he ran into unexpected opposition from Baron de Haymerle of Austria, He
had succeeded Count Andrassy October 8, 1879, shortly after the conclusion
57
of the Dual Alliance. Haymerle desired an alliance with England rather
than with Russia. He feared that an agreement with Russia would result in
the emnity of Britain and the end of Anglo-Austrian cooperation in the
Balkans. At first he strongly resisted the proposals for the reestablish-
es
ment of the Drelkaiserbund . Bismarck used two arguments to persuade
Haymerle. One was that an alliance with Russia would prevent a Franco-
Russian agreement against Germany, or an Italo-Russian move against the Dual
Monarchy. Secondly, Russia would not be able to alter the status quo in
the Balkans without the consent of the two German states. These arguments
plus the replacement of Disraeli's government with that of Austrophobe
Gladstone, forced Haymerle to the alliance.
Finally on June 18, 1881 the Drelkaiserbund was revived but it differed
from the old alliance of 1872. It had been formed only to strengthen an
understanding of the monarchial governments in the interests of political
and social order. The new alliance went much further and embodied pro-
visions of a pro-Russian-Austrian nature.
* Ibid
., p. 275.
^7Ibid., p. 26k.
^"Jelavich, Tsarist Russia , p. 23.
*9Ibld., p. 21*.
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On the question of the Straits, the agreement reached was decidedly
against England, The thre9 Empires agreed that in the event of England's
taking action on the Eastern Question further than may coincide with the
interests of the powers, and in particular if the British fleet should rnke
any motion towards passing the Dardanelles, Germany, Austria and Russia
should agree to prevent this intention by a joint declaration. A 3econd
major provision of this alliance was that Germany would be guaranteed Russian
neutrality in case of a Franco-German war. Austria Hungary received the
assurance that, in the event of a renewed Russo-Turkish war Russia wouid
not make changes in the status quo without consulting her allies. Two
major alterations in the Treaty of Berlin were also made. Austria received
recognition of her right to annex Bosnia-Heraegovina when she deemed annex-
ation opportune. Russia obtained Austrian agreement to the union oi the
A?
two Bulgarias, but only if action took place by force of circumstance.
After the agreement had been completed between the three Emperors,
Bismarck had the opportunity presented to himself to further strengthen his
system of alliances and further guarantee peace. On January 31, 1882, the
Italian Ambassador, Count Launay, approached Bismarck that his government
desired to associate itself with German-Austrian policy and added that the
King of Italy and his ministers were fully agreed to this point. Bismarck
60
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first told Count Lanuay that there were no questions at issue or likely to
arise between Italy and Germany, their i'rontiers were far aptrt, and khtif
foreign policies likewise did not touch each other. But the interests of
Austria ana Italy—in the Balkans and in the Adriatic, and in the terre
irredente—*rere in frequent contact and collision; and Germany was bounc in
duty to protect Austria. Here was an opportunity to ease the dangerous
Austro-ltalian question. This could set aside the elements of Italian-
Irreden^ism—the aspirations after Trent ana Trieste. Bismarck was aware
of the consequences of an Italo-Austrian war at the same time Germany would
be at war with some other power. Most of Austria's strength would be
sapped away from the area where they could help Germany. As Saperor
William I said* "In dealing with Italy we should not ignore these memories
and should retain her friendship, for 130,000 extra Austrians at Kbnigtrats
(6
might easily hare turned the scale on us."
In Vienna on May 20, 1882 the Dual Alliance became the Triple Alliance,
The preamble of the Treaty staged that the intention of the act was to
increase the guarantees of a general peace, to fortify the monarchical
principle, and thereby to assure the unimparied maintanence of the social
66
and political order in the respective states.
By Article I of the treaty the contracting parties mutually promised
peace and friendship, and engaged themselves to enter into no alliance or
engagement directed against any one of the states. Perhaps the most
6ii
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significant part of the treaty m» that if Italy NN ittftthM by ft nttj
Germany and Austria were bound to MM li her MtlftftMi 1 Lth oil th^if
forces. If any of the cor.trfictlrg parties were attacked all the I ~ting
67
ptrtie* m$% aid *ith all their forces.
As th& year 1382 ca*e to a close Germany was protect -d by three al-
liances, tie Dual Alliance , the r-rc^-.i^rbvri \ tat the Triple ITUlift i
.tics were examples of 3ismarcki6<? Diplomacy. They ha:' ) M "'Jilt
kg the Iron Chancellor to guarantee bimnnet tc tfci horld iff for HMadL*
tarian reason bub because Imperial Germany needed peace,
Bismarck could regard the situation in bortft as favorable to 7er<any.
The basic tool by which he hoped to isolate France, the Dreikalsgr'-und, had
weathered the storm that climaxed la the Congress of Eerlin, June 13 until
July 13, 1878. Austria, Fo.ssia and Germany bad once again agreed to cooperate
in matters that effected their interests. On top of this, Germany hai gained
further security through the formation of the Triple Alliance which Vrought
Ttaly into the system of alliances. As a result, for the time being, Germany
would no longer have to wcrry ribtRt Austria becoming involved in a dispute
with Italy, ncr France heading a coalition hostile to Germany,
At this time, the 3isir.arckian system cf Alliances reached its brightest
moment, Germany was connected by alliances and agreements, directly or
indirectly with Austria-Hungary, Russia, Serbia, Roumania, Spain, Italy and
England, Certainly, Bismarck could enjoy a feeling of security.
67
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However, Biamarek was not an optimist. : . /at ooapli 5 of
thi alliance 1 1 he had helped to create and the pro 1 L U Lavolw ' 1
Maintaining the j tat aa qjo . This s ta be 1 1 1 t nade by Bismarck in hii v ; rs
addoc evidence to this fact: "la the future not only military equipment
but also a correct political eye will be inquired to guide the German ship
of state throu h the current oi coalitions to which we are exposed In
69
consequence to our geographic? j. position and our previous history,"
In Bismarck's raind, the future of Germany could rest only upon remaining
strong militarily, and through international alliances in which Germany would
play the dominant role. As long as a statesman oi Biaaarffilf'a stature headed
the German stats, this system of alliances could be maintained. Bat, if the
leadership of the German nation ever would fall into the hands of lesser
individuals, Germany Bight find the system of alliances hard to elatain tad
could fall victim tc a hostile coalition*
Ibiu., p. 6.
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With the convening of the Congress of Berlin June 13, 1878, Otto von
3ismarck reached the pinnacle of his diplomatic career. The Iron Chancellor
of Oarmany presided over a meeting of the leading statesmen of Europe who
met to deci ie the fate of toe Treaty of San Stefano signed between ussia
and Turkeyj but bitterly contested by England and Austria.
Prince Bismarck announced that he would serve as the "Honest Broker11
,
and guide the powers through the Congress of Berlin, Tie would merely be
an umpire between England, Austria and Russia, As head of a nation who had
no interests in the East, his role would be one of disinterest and aloofness.
But was this his true role at the Congress? Did he actually preside as
the disinterested President, anj was he as aloof in the negotiations proceeding
the Congress as he pretended to be? Was he the "Honest Broker" who got the
job done? The purpose of this study was to find answers to these questions
and to determine Prince Bismarck «s true role in the negotiations proceeding
the Congress and in the meeting itself.
The conclusion drawn was that Bismarck was not the disinterested broker
expecting nothing out of the Congress. He believed he must participate in
order to best protect the interests o! Germany because he was firmly convinced
that German security was at stake. The gains Hussia had made in the Balkans
and the international reaction to the Treaty of San 3tefeno presented "ermany
with a two fold threat. One, the peace ot Europe was endangered anu two,
the security of Austria was threatened. Both of these principles were keys
to Bismarckian iorelnn policy.
In order to end this threat to German security, the gains Russia had
made by the Treaty of San Stefano ha^ to bo set aside. Therefore, in the
negotiations proceeding the Congress, and in the actual meeting of the
powers, Bismarck schemin;ly and systematically worked to tho uisaivantage of
3ussie« As a result, Otto yon Bismarck, the honest broker of the Congress
of Berlin must bo described as beinc sli htly dishonest.

